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THE NEW FORMALISM:
REQUIEM FOR TIERED SCRUTINY?
Calvin Massey
INTRODUCTION
Tiered scrutiny developed during the twentieth century to solve
the problem of how to mediate the presumed validity of government
action and the presumptive primacy of individual rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. As the pace and scope of government regulation
of daily life increased during that century, the occasions for conflict
between these principles became more frequent. Perhaps for that
reason, tiered scrutiny assumed ever-increasing complexity. Inter-
mediate scrutiny joined strict scrutiny and the default level, minimal
scrutiny. Debate ensued concerning whether courts should assess the
legislature's hypothetical purposes, stated purposes, or engage in a
judicial quest for its actual purposes. Rarefied discussion of the rela-
tive importance of governmental objectives became a staple of tiered
scrutiny, as did fine distinctions concerning the closeness of the fit
between the challenged means and the government's objectives. In-
evitably, the discussion broadened to include the appropriate method
for locating those liberties deemed so fundamental that their inva-
sion by government ought to be treated as presumptively unlawful.
Tiered scrutiny was held together by the idea that courts could de-
tect which legislative or executive actions were presumptively void,
and subject them to searching inquiry with the burden ofjustification
placed squarely on the government. The central idea began to be
undermined as intermediate scrutiny was developed because inter-
mediate scrutiny injected the idea that some presumptively unlawful
actions were more easily justifiable than others. As courts then began
to experiment with invalidating some government actions under
minimal scrutiny, the coherence of minimal scrutiny was further un-
dermined, for it was not clear whether the minimal scrutiny that was
employed in striking down some presumptively valid classifications
was the same minimal scrutiny that had been used to uphold most
such classifications.
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With the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Lawrence v. Texas' and
Grutter v. Bollinger,2 the time has come for an examination of the con-
tinued vitality of tiered scrutiny. If this were medicine, the prognosis
would be guarded and the prudent physician would be recommend-
ing a change in the patient's lifestyle. But constitutional law is surely
not medicine and any prognosis of tiered scrutiny must be cautious
indeed. Nevertheless, it is not too soon to declare that the combined
effect of the methods employed by the Court in Lawrence and Grutter
has done serious damage to the health of tiered scrutiny. Taken to-
gether, Lawrence and Grutter display a Court that has embraced the
form of tiered scrutiny but snubbed its substance. The flaccidity of
the strict scrutiny employed in Grutter, coupled with the robust skep-
ticism of the minimal scrutiny employed in Lawrence, suggests that the
neat compartments of tiered scrutiny are beginning to collapse.
Whether the Court's new formalism will prove to be the beginning of
the end of tiered scrutiny, or merely the end of the beginning of the
development of some new methodology that mediates between gov-
ernment power and individual liberties, remains to be seen.
In Part I of this Article, I chart the basics of the development and
use of tiered scrutiny in order to bring into focus the terrain upon
which the Court operated in Lawrence and Grutter. Part II focuses on
Lawrence and the instability it has produced and will continue to pro-
duce in the application of minimal scrutiny. Part III engages in a
similar inquiry with respect to Grutter. Part IV examines the future of
tiered scrutiny in light of the destabilizing effects of Lawrence and
Grutter.
The Court is faced with inescapable choices. The first reality of
choice is that the Court must continually make hard decisions about
constitutional values, a task that has predated tiered scrutiny, accom-
panied its development and application, and will continue no matter
what comes next. The issue at hand is the nature of the method by
which the Court will make those choices. It might choose to rein-
vigorate tiered scrutiny by paying greater heed to its doctrinal postu-
lates and making the hard choices of constitutional value selection at
the outset of examination, as a threshold matter to channel the level
of judicial review that should apply to the contested government ac-
tion. The Court might choose to abandon tiered scrutiny and to em-
brace the more fluid scrutiny championed by Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall in equal protection cases, a scrutiny that admitted frankly that
all cases lay along a spectrum of constitutional values that must be ac-
1 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
2 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
(Vol. 6:5
THE NEWFORMALISM
counted for in a somewhat ad hoc fashion.3 The Court might embark
upon some more radical departure from tiered scrutiny, such as the
libertarian ideal of presuming that all government action is void until
the government has offered an adequate justification for its use of
power.' Or, the Court might delight those who see little harm in
wielding government power at every opportunity and revert to a more
deferential posture with respect to government action by adopting a
highly textual and historically rigid view of the pantheon of individual
liberties. Finally, it may be that the present slide of tiered scrutiny
into incoherence is but the harbinger of some new way for courts to
mediate the clash between government power and individual liber-
ties. If so, that new vision is not yet conceived, and thus its shape and
content cannot yet be described. All we can know for certain is that
the challenge to tiered scrutiny presently exists and that the Court
must make choices about the method by which it will identify the val-
ues that receive the protection of the Constitution. This Article is an
attempt to aid in that process by clarifying where we are and what is
at stake.5
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF TIERED SCRUTINY
Tiered scrutiny was the solution devised by twentieth century legal
imagination to the problem of when to reverse the usual presump-
tion that legislation and executive action authorized by legislation is
valid. In the century and a half prior to the economic, political, and
legal crisis that brought into being the New Deal, American constitu-
tional thinkers were largely preoccupied with issues we today lump
together under the rubric of federalism. From John Jay's tenure as
3 In his dissent to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Jus-
tice Marshall expressed this view:
I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis .... A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it
has applied a spectrum of standards .... [that) comprehends variations in the degree of
[scrutiny] ... depending.., on the constitutional and societal importance of the inter-
est adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the par-
ticular classification is drawn.
Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
4 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 253-69 (2003).
5 Given the highly politically and emotionally charged content of the matters at issue in
Lawrence and Grutter, and the fact that this Article is critical of the method employed in each
case, I wish to state at the outset that I applaud the result in each case. The tendency in legal
academia today is to go straight to the result, dismiss those who disagree with you, embrace
those who agree, and stop reading and thinking at that point. This is, of course, a deplorable
state of affairs and, fortunately, not universal. I trust that readers will understand that this is an
article about methodology, and not about whether Lawrence or Grutter was right or wrong in its
outcome. I thus direct my Article to that portion of the academy that is still interested in legal
method and has not entirely conflated law and politics.
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Chief Justice, to well after the Civil War, the Court was concerned
primarily with the nature of the federal union and the scope of fed-
eral and state authority. Issues of personal liberty were rarely ad-
dressed squarely, partly because the Bill of Rights was not applicable
to the states, and partly because the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury legal consciousness conceived of liberty as the absence of gov-
ernmental power. That consciousness necessarily faded as the com-
plexity of the industrial age mandated a larger scope for
governmental power, and as technological advancements in transpor-
tation and communication created a truly national economy. No
longer could it be assumed that liberty inhered merely in the absence
of authority for government to act; now it was necessary to think
more often of liberty as residing in the veto power of individual liber-
ties, a power to be invoked by litigants and exercised bv judges. Of
course, this power has existed since Marbury v. Madison (and, some-
what less securely, existed even before Marbury), but it had been
largely a latent power primarily in the first century of our constitu-
tional experience. With the vastly changed social, economic, and po-
litical conditions of a no-longer-juvenile industrial age, however, the
veto power of individual liberties could not remain dormant. Thus it
was that the twentieth century became the historical moment in
which the constitutional law of individual liberties, like the cosmos,
seemed to be an ever-expanding universe. No longer did individual
rights begin where governmental power ended; now the playing cards
of governmental power were always susceptible to check by the trump
cards of individual liberties.
Although judicial review may have acquired an occasionally jaun-
diced eye as early as Marbury, at least since United States v. Carolene
Products Co.,8 the courts have attempted to fashion a modem doctrine
of tiered scrutiny. The iconic Footnote Four,9 planted to suggest ap-
propriate indicators of presumptive unconstitutionality, was only the
beginning of the venture. If constitutional liberties are indeed to
function as judicially enforceable vetoes upon democratic outcomes,
6 See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833). In Barron, the
Court held:
[T] he provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a
limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not
applicable to the legislation of the states.
Id.
7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review).
8 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (holding that a statute prohibiting the shipment of filled milk in in-
terstate commerce is not unconstitutional on its face, and thus is presumptively within the
power of interstate commerce and consistent with due process).
9 Id. at 152 n.4 ("[Pirejudice against discrete and insular minorities... may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching inquiry.").
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there must be some system by which we can identify which sausages
that emerge from the legislative factory are suspected to be tainted.
Only then can we toss them into the judicial hopper for close scrutiny
with a skeptical eye. The tools are familiar, though they range across
the panorama of constitutional law. Classifications by race or na-
tional origin are deeply suspicious, and can only be upheld if the
government overcomes "strict scrutiny" by proving that the suspect
classification is necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling gov-
ernmental objective. This is not easy to do. One of the few racial
classifications that survived such scrutiny is the now near universally
discredited Korematsu v. United States,0 in which the Court upheld the
mass incarceration of Japanese nationals and Americans of Japanese
ancestry during World War II on the belief that it was a "military im-
perative" to do so." Classifications that materially infringe on fun-
damental constitutional liberties (for equal protection purposes,
those that are explicit or implicit in the Constitution, 2 an unhelpfully
open-ended definition; for due process gurposes, those that are
deeply rooted in our history and tradition and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty,14 a no-more-helpful definition) are also pre-
sumed to be void, and may be upheld only if such infringements can
be justified under strict scrutiny. Regulations of speech that turn on
the content of the speech,5 or the viewpoint of the speaker, 6 are also
presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny, except when the
Supreme Court decides that an entire category of speech (defined by
its content) is so removed from the central purposes for protecting
freedom of speech that it can be suppressed wholesale 7 (but not if
10 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
1Id. at 219.
12 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) ("[Tjhe key to
discovering whether [a right] is 'fundamental'.... lies in assessing whether [the claimed right
is] explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.").
13 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition ... .'" (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977))).
14 See id. at 721 ("[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are . .. 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty... ." (quoting Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937))).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("[Content-
based regulations] must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If
a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.").
16 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995)
("[This court has] observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination,
which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations.").
17 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 855-56 (2001).
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the mechanism of suppression is for a reason other than the reason
the entire category is exiled from the pantheon of constitutional lib-
erties) .18 Regulations that impinge upon religious belief, or have par-
ticularized impact upon religious conduct, are presumed to violate
the Free Exercise Clause unless the government can justify the in-
fringement under strict scrutiny. 9
More controversially, classifications by sex or illegitimate birth are
thought, at least by the Court, to be more frequently germane to le-
gitimate social and political goals. Such classifications should be re-
garded as only mildly suspicious, but still suspicious enough that for
them to be valid, the government must prove that its actual objective
is important (but not compelling), and that the classification is sub-
stantially related (but not necessary) to the accomplishment of the
important objective. This level of judicial scrutiny is politely termed
intermediate scrutiny, though Justice Scalia derides it as a standard
with "no established criterion 2 for its use and, thus, as being applied
"when it seems like a good idea to load the dice." 21
Variations on the theme of intermediate scrutiny are also to be
found in the vast bog of free speech jurisprudence. Content-neutral
regulations of the time, place, or manner of speech are valid if "they
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication."2
Such a regulation is "narrowly tailored" if the government's interest
would be less effectively achieved without the regulation, and if the
regulation does not "burden substantially more speech than is neces-
sary to further the government's legitimate interests., 23  Under the
virtually identical O'Brien test,2 4 otherwise lawful regulations of behav-
ior that impinge on expressive conduct are valid if they further an
"important or substantial governmental interest" that is "unrelated to
18 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (explaining that certain catego-
ries of speech may validly "be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content
(obscenity, defamation, etc.)- [but] they are [not] categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to
their distinctively proscribable content").
19 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny to en-
forcement of Oregon drug laws against ceremonial ingestion of peyote).
20 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21 Id.
2 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
23 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). In Ward, the Court specifically
rejected the idea that "narrow tailoring," in the context of content-neutral time, place, and
manner speech regulations, requires the government to use the least speech restrictive means
of accomplishing its objectives. Id. at 800.
24 The O'Brien test, derived from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), has been char-
acterized by the Court in Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (footnote omitted), as "little, if any, different
from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions." See also Ward, 491 U.S. at
797-98 (citing the characterization of the O'Brien test in Clark).
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the suppression of free expression" and the "incidental restriction on
[free expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest."2  Whatever may have been the original intent of the
Court in crafting the final element of the O'Brien test, it is now clear
that because O'Brien only applies to "a content-neutral restriction,
least restrictive means analysis is not required. 2 6  Intermediate scru-
tiny also applies to commercial speech, at least at the moment, under
the Central Hudson test, which validates those regulations of advertis-
ing that "directly advance"2 7 a substantial governmental interest and
that are "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
2 8
The default level of scrutiny is, of course, so-called "rational basis"
review, or minimal scrutiny. In theory, government actions that are
not subject to some higher level of judicial scrutiny are presumed to
be valid and may only be set aside when the challenger of the action
can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either the gov-
ernment has no legitimate purpose for its action or that the action is
not rationally related to the accomplishment of any legitimate pur-
pose. However, even this default level of scrutiny is not monolithic.
The justices argue over whether the search for legitimate purposes
should be confined to the purposes stated by the legislature, or to the
actual purposes of the legislation, or extended to any conceivable
purpose, however outlandish or hypothetical. 9 The application of
25 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
26 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 301-02 (2000) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-99 &
n.6).
27 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
28 Id. at 566. Judicial unhappiness with Central Hudson is, however, well-known and its con-
tinued vitality is in some doubt. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plu-
rality opinion), the Court voided Rhode Island's ban on price advertising of liquor in order to
promote temperance, though no majority could coalesce on the rationale. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, noted that "when a State entirely prohibits the dis-
semination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the pres-
ervation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review
that the First Amendment generally demands." Id. at 501. justice Scalia registered his "discom-
fort" with Central Hudson but concurred in its application. Id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas thought that Central Hudson should
not apply to "cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal us-
ers of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace."
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In any case, the
final prong of Central Hudson, under which the government must prove that its advertising
speech restrictions are "'not more extensive than is necessary to serve [its] interest[s],'" means
that "if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict [commer-
cial] speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so." Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367, 371 (2002) (citing Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 556).
29 Compare the various opinions in United States R.R Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
Justice Rehnquist (as he then was) argued that where there exist "plausible reasons" for legisla-
tive action, even if those reasons are not articulated anywhere in the legislative record, the
search for a conceivable, hypothetical purpose is at an end. Id. at 179. To be sure, Rehnquist
was criticized by Justices Stevens and Brennan in their respective dissents for declaring tauto-
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
minimal scrutiny is rendered even more opaque by the Court's reluc-
tance to identify any general principles that determine when a gov-
ernment's purpose, whether stated, actual, or hypothetical, is ille-
gitimate. Perhaps the best that can be done is to note, as did the
Court in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, that "a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot consti-
tute a legitimate governmental interest."st Of course, to identify when
governments have such baseness as their objective is no mean feat,
especially if courts are willing to rely on any conceivable or hypo-
thetical objective as the defining purpose of the legislation. As a re-
sult, in those few cases in which the Supreme Court has concluded
that legislation subject to minimal scrutiny lacks a legitimate purpose,
it has generally eschewed the search for any conceivable hypothetical
purpose and focused on what the Court views as the government's ac-
tual purpose. In Moreno, the Court brushed aside government con-
tentions that a statutory ban on receipt of food stamps by households
composed of unrelated persons was rationally related to the asserted
purpose of minimizing fraud. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
first contended that the ban was "clearly irrelevant to the stated pur-
poses" of the food stamp program, which was declared by Congress to
be alleviating hunger and malnutrition, and also strengthening the
agricultural economy.3 ' As Justice Brennan held the view that stated
purposes govern in minimal scrutiny unless those purposes are irrele-
vant or contrary to the classification, he was intellectually free to ex-
amine the actual purpose of Congress in enacting the ban,32 which he
deduced from the legislative history to be "to prevent so-called 'hip-
pies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp
",3program.
logically that the "plain language of [the statute] marks the beginning and the end of our in-
quiry"; but the import of Rehnquist's tautology was simply that if plausible, conceivable (albeit
hypothetical) purposes support a legislative classification, that is the end of judicial review un-
der minimal scrutiny. Id. at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 176 (Rehnquist, J.,
writing for the Court)). Justice Brennan argued that courts should start with the legislatively
stated purpose, not any conceivable purpose, and uphold classifications that rationally further
such purposes. Id. But when challenged classifications are "either irrelevant to or counter to
that purpose," Brennan contended that courts may uphold such classifications only if they are
"rationally related to achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 188. In
his usual idiosyncratic fashion, Justice Stevens argued for a judicial quest of discovery of "a cor-
relation between the classification and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate
purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature." Id. at 181
(Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment).
30 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
31 Id.
32 See supra note 29.
IS Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
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A similar process was undertaken in Romer v. Evans, 4 in which the
Court invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2 to its constitution. The
provision at issue sought to prevent any unit of Colorado government
from recognizing sexual orientation as a basis for asserting any "pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination.""3 The Court dismissed two
conceivable and hypothetical purposes for the proposed amendment:
preservation of associational freedom and conservation of scarce re-
sources to combat more inimical forms of discrimination. 6  The
Court found these purposes not to be credible given the extraordi-
nary breadth of disability imposed on homosexuals: the loss "even of
the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary dis-
crimination."07 Although it is a familiar principle of minimal scrutiny
in equal protection jurisprudence that neither overinclusion nor un-
derinclusion will, by itself, be sufficient to invalidate a challenged
classification,8 the Court in Romer relied on the overinclusion of
Amendment 2 in terms of its putative purposes to abandon reliance
on conceivable and hypothetical purposes. Instead, the Court treated
overinclusion as a condition enabling it to engage in a search for
Colorado's actual purpose in enacting Amendment 2. No matter how
formidable the obstacles may be to determining the collective intent
of a deliberative body, those obstacles become child's play when
compared to the difficulties of ascertaining the actual purpose of the
entire Colorado electorate.6 Undaunted, the Court concluded that
Colorado's purpose was animosity toward homosexuals-the desire to
"deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws"a°-and reached that
conclusion mostly by reasoning from the likely effect of the text of
the provision. Thus, in Romer, the search for actual purposes was
merged into then-Justice Rehnquist's declaration in Fritz, that the
"plain language" of the contested provision "marks the beginning
and end of our inquiry."
4 1
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
35 See id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, amend. 2, § 30b).
36 Id. at 630.
37 Id. The effect of Amendment 2 was to prevent any assertion of a claim that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation might be arbitrary and, thus, lawless. Putting aside the ques-
tion of whether and in what contexts such discrimination might in fact be arbitrary, Amend-
ment 2 had the effect of forbidding even the assertion of such claims, much less their resolution
in favor of the aggrieved claimant.
See id.; see also, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (finding
overinclusion); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (finding overinclusion and un-
derinclusion); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding underin-
clusion); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. NewYork, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (finding underinclusion).
39 Cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 619 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analyzing the
difficulties attendant to ascertaining the actual purposes of a legislature in enacting legislation).
40 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
41 United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186 (1980); see supra note 29.
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An impartial observer might be pardoned for pausing a moment
to ponder the somewhat ineffable question of when a court engaged
in minimal scrutiny should look to any conceivable, hypothetical
purpose and when it should focus only on actual purpose. Such a by-
stander might conclude that any conceivable purpose suffices unless
the classification serves all of those conceivable purposes very badly
indeed. Then, the actual purpose is to be divined from the effects of
the classification, insofar as the effects can be inferred from the text.
But, can that be the operative principle? If it is, how does one ac-
count for Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York" or New Orleans v.
Dukes?4" Ostensibly to ensure traffic safety, New York City barred Rail-
way Express from advertising others' wares on its delivery vans while
permitting thousands of virtually identical delivery vans to advertise
their owners' wares. Surely the purpose of traffic safety was very badly
served by such a pointed and narrow ban on delivery van advertising,
and the effect of the ban was to deprive common carrier vans from
earning advertising revenue. That revealed actual purpose may have
been a legitimate purpose (or it might have been illegitimate if it
amounted to a naked desire to harm such businesses), but the Court
in Railway Express did not survey that issue; it was enough for the
Court to declare: "It is no requirement of equal protection that all
evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."" Similarly, in
Dukes the Court upheld New Orleans's refusal to permit pushcart
vendors to operate in the French Quarter while exempting those
vendors who had operated there for eight years prior to the ban. The
Court was satisfied that the ban "rationally furthers the pur-
pose... '[of preserving] the appearance and custom valued by the
Quarter's residents and attractive to tourists," '45 although one can
readily imagine a wide variety of less arbitrary and more even-handed
ways by which New Orleans could have catered to the subjective tastes
of residents and tourists in its French Quarter.
If further confusion is needed, let it be supplied by a sampling
from the cases that apply an enhanced brand of minimal scrutiny. A
standard number in this repertoire is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.46 in which Cleburne, Texas, refused to allow a group
home for the mentally retarded, but permitted virtually every other
sort of group care and multiple-dwelling facility to locate within its
borders. The Court rejected two conceivable government interests as
42 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
43 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44 Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 110.
45 See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 304 (quoting Dukes v. New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir.
1974)).
4 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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illegitimate: the unsubstantiated "negative attitudes" of nearby prop-
erty owners and the equally "vague, undifferentiated fears" of crimi-
nal harassment of the residents by neighborhood juveniles.4 s The
Court, then, concluded that the remaining objectives (i.e. concern
about the number of occupants and that the facility would be located
within a flood plain) were legitimate but that the city's refusal to
permit the group home was not rationally related to those legitimate
concerns.' Without much discussion of the point, the Court simply
concluded that the city's refusal "appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded."'' In effect, the Court im-
plied that the extraordinarily underinclusive nature of the classifica-
tion so poorly served the ostensible purposes of concern about the
number of residents and the home's location on a flood plain that it
freed the Court from reliance on such hypothetical purposes. When
the Court stated that it "appears to us" that the city's refusal "rest[s]
on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded," it was es-
sentially stating that the Court saw the actual purpose of the city to be
infliction of harm upon the mentally retarded.
Somewhat more dramatic is the familiar case of Plyler v. Doe,5' in
which the Court invalidated Texas's attempt to deprive unlawful resi-
dent children of the free public education that the state provided to
citizens and lawful resident alien children. The Court conceded that
education was not a fundamental right for purposes of equal protec-
tion, and that a classification based on illegal residence within the
United States is not a suspect classification, but the level of scrutiny it
applied was hardly the standard-brand minimal scrutiny. To be
sure, the Court did not fully embrace minimal scrutiny as its stan-
dard; rather, it cryptically observed that "certain forms of legislative
classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to re-
curring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we
have [inquired whether the classification] ... may fairly be viewed as
furthering a substantial interest of the State."53 Texas's classification
proved to be one such classification and the Court shifted the burden
onto Texas of proving the existence of a substantial government in-
terest. The Court concluded that the free schooling ban was "ludi-
crously ineffectual" to accomplish Texas's goal of protecting "itself
from an influx of illegal immigrants."54 Nor was there sufficient proof
47 Id. at 448-49.
48 Id. at 449.
49 Id. at 450.
50 Id.
5 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
52 Id. at 221.
53 Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 228.
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that illegally present schoolchildren imposed unique burdens "on the
State's ability to provide high-quality public education. ' Finally, the
Court found that Texas's desire to deliver public education to those
children that are, by virtue of American citizenship or lawful resi-
dence, likely to contribute to American society was an insufficiently
substantial interest because "whatever savings might be achieved by
denying [unlawful resident] children an education, they are wholly
insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State,
and the Nation."
Cleburne applied minimal scrutiny in a fashion similar to Romer,
while Plyler applied a facially enhanced version of minimal scrutiny.
As in Romer, the Court in Cleburne scrutinized the efficacy of the classi-
fication to its conceivable purposes and, having determined that the
classification was ill-suited to the government's purposes, reasoned
from its effects to conclude that the government's actual purpose was
illegitimate.. The only difference was that in Romer the classification
was severely overbroad in terms of the purported objectives, while in
Cleburne the classification was wildly underinclusive. But these flaws
did not disturb judicial deference to conceivable, even if dubious,
governmental purposes in such cases as Railway Expres 7 or United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz -8 In Plyler, the Court applied a
unique brand of minimal scrutiny, one ridiculed by the dissent as "a
theory custom-tailored to the facts," and applicable "only when illegal
alien children are deprived of a public education."59 Whether or not
the criticism is fair, the fact remains that Plyler applied a facially
heightened brand of minimal scrutiny to a circumstance that the
Court admitted would normally be subject to the sort of rational
means-to-ends inquiry that is associated with Railway Express, Dukes, or
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.6
Thus, even cursory reflection upon the state of minimal scrutiny
proves to be troubling and unsettling. What seems like a standard of
extreme deference to legislatures turns out to be less deferential in its
application. This is not altogether problematic, however, once one
realizes that at some level of underinclusion or overinclusion, albeit a
level difficult to detect with precision, the Court is apt to shift from
deferential consideration of conceivable purposes to a skeptical
search for actual purposes. The black art of the constitutional lawyer,
5 Id. at 229.
5 Id. at 230.
57 336 U.S. 106 (1949); see also supra text accompanying note 43.
58 449 U.S. 166 (1980); see also supra note 28.
59 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (using minimal scrutiny analysis to an Oklahoma law making it illegal
for an optician to fit or duplicate lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or op-
tometrist).
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of course, is the ability to recognize in advance what will trigger that
subtle, but terribly important, shift in the Court's consideration of
governmental purposes in its application of minimal scrutiny. So
long as the triggers for that shift were extreme underinclusion or
overinclusion embedded in facts that produce, at least, a detectable
odor of governmental desire to harm the people affected by the gov-
ernment's action, constitutional lawyers could understand the rheo-
stat of minimal scrutiny. If, however, the degree of deference courts
pay to legislatures under minimal scrutiny should be permitted to
vary significantly, the problems of identification and prediction of the
de facto level of scrutiny that courts will actually apply would increase
dramatically. That issue might be worrisome enough, but if the de-
gree of judicial skepticism brought to bear under strict scrutiny
should also be permitted to vary considerably, tiered scrutiny would
become almost Delphic. That is exactly what the jurisprudential
couplet of Lawrence v. Texa 1 and Grutter v. Bollinger has done to
tiered scrutiny.
II. LAWRENCEAND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MINIMAL SCRUTINY
Lawrence has beenjustly hailed as a victory for civil libertarians, but
few who cheer its result have tarried to consider its longer-term con-
sequences to constitutional analysis. While Lawrence was a welcome
recognition of the equal dignity to be accorded same-sex relation-
ships, its rationale may prove to further destabilize the already lean-
ing tower of tiered scrutiny.
At issue in Lawrence was the validity of a Texas statute that made it
a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in "deviate sexual
intercourse," defined as "any contact between any part of the genitals
of one person and the mouth or anus of another person [or] the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an ob-
ject. 63 The adult petitioners, convicted of violating this law by their
private and consensual conduct, asserted that the law deprived them
of equal protection of the laws and was an impermissible infringe-
ment of a liberty protected by the substantive component of due
process." While the Court acknowledged that the equal protection
claim was "tenable,"6" it rested its decision on the petitioners' substan-
tive due process argument. Most of the Court's effort in this direc-
tion was devoted to a demonstration of the reasons why Bowers v.
61 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
62 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
63 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.06(a), 21.01 (1) (Vernon 2003).
64 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
65 Id. at 2482.
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Hardwick6 was wrongly decided and should be overruled. The Law-
rence majority thought that Bowers had expressed the liberty interest at
issue in that case in an unduly cramped fashion. Rather than focus
upon "the right to engage in certain sexual conduct,"67 as did the
Court in Bowers, the Lawrence majority framed the issue as whether
laws that "seek to control a personal relationship... [offend] the lib-
erty of persons to choose [to enter such relationships] without being
punished as criminals" where there is no "injury to a person or abuse
of an institution the law protects. '' 8
With this revised conception of the affected liberty interest in
place, the Court examined the arguments from history relied upon
by Bowers and found them wanting. First, "there is no longstanding
history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter."69 Second, even general "[f]aws prohibiting sodomy
do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting
in private."70 Third, the trend of legal regulation of homosexual con-
duct and relationships has been clearly headed in the direction of
greater tolerance and acceptance of such matters, and that trend
should have been (but was not) recognized and acknowledged by the
Court in Bowers.7 ' Accordingly, "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."72
A key conclusion of the now-discredited Bowers opinion was that
there was no "fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."
7 3
That conclusion was crucial to the Court's analysis in Bowers, for with-
out a constitutionally fundamental right at issue, Georgia's sodomy
ban needed only to survive minimal scrutiny. To the Bowers majority,
this was easily demonstrated; the prohibition was rationally related to
the accomplishment of the legitimate state objective of proclaiming
the "belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."74
What is surprising about Lawrence is that the Court did not find
that the claimed liberty interests asserted were constitutionally
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding, under minimal scrutiny, Georgia's criminal sodomy stat-
ute as applied to two adult men engaged in private consensual sexual intimacies and conclud-
ing that no fundamental liberty interest was implicated).
67 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
6Id.
69Id.
70 Id. at 2479.
71 See id. at 2480 ("[O]ur laws and traditions in the past half century .... show an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.").
72 Id. at 2484.
73 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
74 Id. at 196.
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fundamental. Despite the Court's eloquent endorsement of the pre-
sumptive liberty of competent adults voluntarily to enter into per-
sonal relationships that involve sexual intimacy without criminal pun-
ishment,75  the Court did not apply strict scrutiny. Instead, it
concluded that the Texas statute was unconstitutional because it "fur-
thers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual."7 6 Although the Court
did not specify what interests Texas advanced in support of its statute,
at oral argument, counsel for Texas asserted that the state's interest
in proclaiming and enforcing a majority vision of morality was suffi-
cient,77 as it was in Bowers.7' Given the repudiation of Bowers by Law-
rence, it is beyond dispute that the Court in Lawrence treated as ille-
gitimate a state's interest in using the criminal law to preserve a vision
of moral behavior, at least when that interest is asserted in opposition
to the liberty interest of consenting adults to engage in private sexual
intimacies as a part of a larger personal relationship.7 9 Thus, Lawrence
presently stands as the lone instance in the modem era of substantive
due process in which the Court has struck down a law on the grounds
that it failed even minimal scrutiny.
To be sure, there are textual morsels in the Court's opinion in
Lawrence that hint that there is something more than minimal scru-
tiny at work in its decision. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
declared:
[A]dults may choose to enter upon [a homosexual] relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
71 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 ("[The Texas statutes] seek to control a personal relation-
ship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of per-
sons to choose without being punished as criminals.").
76 Id. at 2484.
77 See Justices Hear Oral Argument on Texas Homosexual Sodomy Law, 71 U.S. L. WK. 3617, 3618
(Apr. 1, 2003) (counsel for Texas asserted that "morality is the basis for the law"). In her con-
curring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor noted that Texas argued "that the statute satis-
fies rational basis review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the promo-
tion of morality." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
78 In Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court held:
[T]he presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sod-
omy is immoral and unacceptable .... is said to be an inadequate rationale to support
the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality.... We do not
agree, and are unpersuaded that.., sodomy laws... should be invalidated on this basis.
Id. at 196.
The Court approved of the analysis ofJustice Stevens, who dissented in Bowers.
"First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the prac-
tice .... Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship ... are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause .... Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well
as married persons."
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens,J., dissenting)).
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dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.80
In a later passageJustice Kennedy elaborated on this theme:
[T]wo adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, en-
gage[] in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle .... are en-
titled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their ex-
istence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
81the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.
When taken out of the context of the entire opinion, one would
think these passages declarative of a constitutionally fundamental lib-
erty interest, the trigger for strict scrutiny under conventional sub-
stantive due process analysis. Yet, two sentences later, Justice Ken-
nedy punctures this balloon by stating that the Texas law "furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the per-
sonal and private life of the individual, and, after a lofty paragraph
devoted to uniting the usually antagonistic interpretational philoso-
phies of original intent and the nontextual search for contemporary
values that might inform the "living Constitution," winds up reversing
the convictions.3
Let us examine the possibilities. If, despite the Court's resort to a
lack of a legitimate state interest as the reason for reversal of the con-
victions, it was actually covertly declaring a fundamental liberty inter-
est, it is a remarkably limited liberty interest, for it presumably does
not extend to "minors," nor to "persons who might be injured or co-
erced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not
easily be refused."84 Nor does it extend to freely consenting adults in
relationships that "involve public conduct or prostitution," and it
surely does not compel "the government [to] give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.5 ,' This
narrow but arguably fundamental liberty interest-the right of com-
petent adults to engage in mutually consensual private sexual con-
duct as part of a larger personal relationship without criminal liability
80 Id. at 2478 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).
82 Id.
83 Id. Justice Kennedy's opinion stated:
[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses .... knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.
Id.
84 Id.
5 Id.
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attaching to the conductS6-is immune from all state regulation save
that which is necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. However, to reach the conclusion that this inter-
est is constitutionally fundamental, we must ignore or dismiss the
Court's branding as illegitimate Texas's interest in the preservation of
morality; the Court must have been stupid, or deliberately mislead-
ing, or sloppy, or analytically confused when it chose to fasten upon
illegitimacy of the state's purpose as the final nail in the statute's cof-
fin. This will not do; the Court is not readily susceptible to any of
these charges.
If we assume, instead, that the Court meant that the narrow liberty
it described was a nonfundamental liberty, we must first wonder
whether this liberty is different from other nonfundamental liberties,
such as smoking tobacco or marijuana, eating excessive amounts of
fast food, driving a Hummer, cross-dressing, wearing a baseball cap
backwards, or failing to shave one's face or legs. If all such nonfun-
damental liberty interests are alike, they may be freely invaded by any
rational means to advance a legitimate state purpose. In Lawrence,
Texas's interest in preserving its sense of morality was not legitimate;
would the same be true if this interest were asserted to justify in-
fringement of other nonfundamental interests? Suppose a state de-
clared that its sole reason for criminalizing the possession and use of
marijuana or tobacco was its belief that it is immoral to use these sub-
stances. Would the Court declare this to be an illegitimate purpose,
or would it fasten upon the unexpressed but hypothetical purpose of
preserving the health of the citizenry as a sufficiently legitimate state
objective? Would the Court find illegitimate a state's ban on the use
of Hummers on the public highways for the sole reason that the state
has declared such vehicles to be immoral, or would it hasten to add
that the state could surely have been motivated by the desire to in-
crease fuel economy, or traffic safety, or to reduce pollution? To be
sure, it would be an uncommonly obtuse government that would not
advance these alternative interests. Suppose, however, that a state
forbade men and women to dress as members of the opposite sex and
defended the statute on the ground that it preserved the majority's
sense of moral and appropriate behavior. If the libertarian note
struck by the Court in Lawrence is to be sustained, surely the govern-
mental objective is illegitimate. But might it be the case that, absent
some larger personal relationship of which cross-dressing is a part,
the Court would find that the government's interest is legitimate? If
86 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (declaring that the
Court's "established method of substantive-due-process analysis" requires "a 'careful descrip-
tion' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990))).
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the latter is the case, can we be certain that the liberty interest vindi-
cated in Lawrence is an undifferentiated nonfundamental liberty in-
terest? If it is not, and the Lawrence interest is different from other
nonfundamental liberty interests, but is still not fundamental, what
enables us to detect which claimed liberties are a bit more than run-
of-the-mill liberties?
Consider whether the Lawrence nonfundamental but special lib-
erty, even if squeezed to its essence, would insulate from state attack a
mutually consensual continuing sexual relationship between an adult
son and his mother, or a mutually consensual polygamous or polyan-
drous marriage? Lawrence tells us that "[w] hen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,"' a
formulation that is not limited to the homosexual union at issue in
Lawrence. In the next sentence, however, the Court tells us that the
"liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice." ' While Lawrence expressly protects "this
choice" for homosexual couples, its rationale surely extends much
further.
On the other hand, even if the nonfundamental, but still special,
liberty protected by Lawrence is strictly limited to matters of adult, mu-
tually consensual sexual choice as part of a close and continuing per-
sonal relationship, is it possible that Texas could enforce its sodomy
law against two men, strangers to one another, engaged in casual sex?
Texas might argue that such casual sex forms no part of a larger and
enduring personal relationship, and that the sanctity of such relation-
ships was the liberty that Lawrence protected. If this argument failed,
and Texas could not enforce its sodomy law against two men engaged
in casual, anonymous sexual intimacies, then the Lawrence liberty
cannot be so closely confined, and it becomes imperative to restate
the scope and effect of the nonfundamental but exceptionally power-
ful liberty vindicated in Lawrence.
In the end, it is unlikely that the Lawrence liberty can be kept
tightly confined; thus, we must speculate about the effects on mini-
mal scrutiny of the existence of nonfundamental liberties to which no
legitimate state regulatory interests may be directed. We need not
overstate the case; after all, Lawrence held only that the preservation
of majority moral sensibility was not a legitimate state interest, not
that there are no conceivable legitimate state interests that could jus-
tify infringement of the nonfundamental liberty at stake in Lawrence.
Consider, however, some of the consequences of concluding that
governments have no legitimate interest in promoting morality.
87 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478.
8a Id.
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Obscenity is a category of expression that receives no constitutional
protection. Initially this was because obscenity was "utterly without
redeeming social importance,"8 9 but in time the rationale swerved to
recognize a legitimate "social interest in order and morality"9° as the basis
for exiling obscenity from the usual constitutional protections af-
forded to expression.9 ' But if there is no longer any legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in promoting a majoritarian vision of morality, it is
difficult to maintain that obscenity may be denied constitutional pro-
tection simply because its exhibition or consumption degrades moral-
ity. To be sure, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,92 the com-
panion case to Miller v. California,9 3 in which the current
constitutional definition of obscenity was announced, suggested that
government interests other than the preservation of morality might
justify obscenity's constitutional exile.' Some of these interests, how-
ever, are so vague or dubious that there is reason to think that they
may be nothing other than euphemisms for morality. " [T] he interest
of the Rublic in the quality of life and the total community environ-
ment, while no doubt real, is pitched at such a high level of gener-
ality that it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that this interest is, at
bottom, little different than the community's interest in preserving its
intuitive sense of decency and morality. If that is so, the interest is
not legitimate if we take Lawrence at face value. Without some other
89 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
90 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (alteration in original)); see
alsoJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that ob-
scenity may be banned because there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a
decent society").
91 In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court redefined obscenity to include sexu-
ally explicit, prurient, and patently offensive material that, "taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). As Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent to the companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I, the reason obscenity was
denied constitutional protection in Roth was because it utterly lacked any redeeming social
value. See 413 U.S. at 97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A necessary corollary to the Court's ap-
proach to obscenity in Miller was the creation of a new rationale for obscenity's devalued consti-
tutional status. The majority in Paris Adult Theatre Ioffered several possibilities, some utilitarian,
see id. at 58 (suggesting the interest of "the tone of commerce in the great city centers"), some
based on moral notions, see id. at 61 ("[A] legislature could legitimately act ... to protect 'the
social interest in order and morality.'" (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 572) (alteration in original)), and some based on a combination of morals and utilitarianism,
see Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 63 (noting that a legislature may validly assume "that com-
merce in obscene books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to
exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior").
92 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
93 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
94 ParisAdult TheatreI, 413 U.S. at 58, 61 (agreeing with the justification that "there is at least
an arguable correlation between obscene material and crime" and that "the legislature of Geor-
gia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist").
95 Id. at 58.
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governmental interest, ungrounded in morality, there is no reason to
continue denying constitutional protection to obscenity. Whether
this is cause for celebration or lamentation depends on whether you
view obscenity, as did Justice Douglas, as a constitutionally protected
matter of "taste" that "at most is the expression of offensive ideas,"96
or whether you regard obscenity as a danger to "public safety gv or in-
imical to the "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a de-
cent society."8
Prohibitions against sexual intercourse outside of marriage, such
as laws forbidding fornication or adultery, while not commonly en-
forced, are still in existence. Assuming that there is no constitution-
ally fundamental right to engage in sexual relations without the
blessing of marriage, the liberty interest asserted to block enforce-
ment of such laws is the Lawrence interest-the liberty of adults to en-
gage in mutually consensual private sexual conduct as part of a larger
personal relationship without criminal liability attaching to the con-
duct. Surely Lawrence must support the proposition that a state could
not defend its fornication or adultery ban, as applied to a couple en-
gaged in a relationship that includes but extends beyond sexual con-
duct, on the ground that the state's interest is morality. Consider,
however, Justice Kennedy's cautionary note in Lawrence that the lib-
erty interest there asserted "should counsel against attempts.., to
define the meaning of the relationship or set its boundaries absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." 9 Does
this permit a state to assert that its interest in enforcing a ban on for-
nication or adultery is to protect the institution of marriage, an insti-
tution that the law most definitely protects? In the context of the
homosexual relationship at issue in Lawrence, it is not tenable to offer
the protection of marriage as a governmental interest sufficient to
support criminalization of homosexual conduct because Texas does
not offer marriage (or even its civil union substitute) to persons in
homosexual relationships. While it is unlikely (but not impossible)
that a state would permit same-sex marriage and also criminalize all
sexual conduct (heterosexual or homosexual) occurring outside of
marriage, it is surely plausible to read Lawrence as permitting such a
scheme.
Those who decry Lawrence often assert that its effect will be to void
"[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
91 Id. at 70-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 69.
98 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), quoted in Paris Adult
Theatre, 413 U.S. at 59-60.
99 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
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obscenity."1 00 This may be so, if Lawrence ultimately stands for the idea
that moral disapproval is insufficient to infringe upon the liberty to
enter into a mutually consensual enduring relationship of which sex-
ual conduct forms but a part. But it will not be so if the liberty inter-
est in Lawrence is not weighty enough to void morals legislation that is
calculated to reach "public conduct or prostitution,"0 to protect mi-102
nors or persons who are in relationships in which they are vulner-
able or "might be ... coerced,'03 or to prevent injury to a person"'
or "abuse of an institution the law protects."'15 Depending on the
evidence of vulnerability or coercion, these caveats might permit valid
enforcement of laws prohibiting bigamy, adult incest, adultery, and
fornication. As discussed above, laws against fornication and adul-
tery, as well as bigamy, might also be enforced as preventing abuse of
the institution of marriage. Laws prohibiting masturbation (are there
any?) and bestiality would seem to be doomed unless the concept of
preventing "injury to a person" is read to include injury to the actor.
Even then, it is hard to make out a credible case for injury that may
result from masturbation. Bestiality, however, may present a different
matter, as it is possible that venereal diseases may be transmitted from
animals to humans. But such is the result of Lawrence we are now
required to parse either the utilitarian reasons for morals legislation
or to subject the nonfundamental liberty interest that Lawrence pro-
tects to a microscopic examination of its boundaries.
Thus, we are left with a mildly disconcerting set of possibilities.
Some liberty interests are fundamental and are, therefore, immune
from governmental regulation unless the government can prove the
necessity of invading the interest to accomplish a compelling objec-
tive. Access to contraceptive devices is said to be such an interest, but
a careful reading of the holdings suggests that this right is actually
grounded in a mixture of equal protection' and the shadow cast by
various provisions of the Bill of Rights other than due process.0 7 In
any case, this right is commonly regarded as a constitutionally fun-
damental liberty interest, however dubious its doctrinal pedigree may
be. Some liberty interests are apparently not fundamental, in that
governmental regulation of them need not survive strict scrutiny, but
100 Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 2484 (KennedyJ., delivering the opinion of the Court).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2478.
105 Id.
106 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down conviction for distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons on equal protection grounds).
107 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (grounding the right to privacy in
the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights).
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still produce a heightened level of review. The principal example is,
of course, abortion in the wake of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.' Prior
to Casey, a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy was a constitu-
tionally fundamental liberty interest; the trimester framework of Roe
v. Wade09 was the Court's way of assessing whether governmental in-
terests at any point during gestation might be sufficiently compelling
to justify infringement of the abortion right. After Casey, the nature
of the inquiry completely shifted; rather than asking whether any
given regulation of abortion survived strict scrutiny, the question be-
came whether, prior to fetal viability, the regulation imposed an "un-
due burden" on the exercise of the abortion right."0 The existence
of an "undue burden" turns on whether the "regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.""' After Lawrence,
some nonfundamental liberty interests that trigger only minimal
scrutiny will, nevertheless, escape regulation for want of a legitimate
government interest in regulating them. We remain uncertain
whether this is a distinct category consisting of nonfundamental liber-
ties that are so unique and potent that no legitimate government in-
terest in regulating them can be imagined. In any case, there remain
the run-of-the-mill liberty interests that may presumptively be regu-
lated so long as the government has a conceivably legitimate objective
and its regulation is a rational means of accomplishing that objective.
In this category lie all our petty (but often cherished) liberties that
governments freely invade in the name of some legitimate interest.
Sorting out these liberties is not easy. Washington v. Glucksberk.'2
confidently asserted that the "established method of substantive-due-
process analysis" has regularly confined "fundamental rights and lib-
erties [to those] which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed."" Application of that method is not simple. First, it re-
quires selecting the appropriate level of generality with which to ex-
press the right at issue. Extremely general formulations of a claimed
108 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
109 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Only where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make [the] decision [to abort]
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."). This is, of course, a plurality opinion, but in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921
(2000), a majority of the Court explicitly adopted Casey's undue burden test as the operative
standard for assessing the validity of abortion regulations.
III Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.).
112 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
11 Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1997), and Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (citations omitted)).
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liberty interest garner nearly universal assent, but are so abstract that
they are useless in application. Speaking of a right of self-
determination will win nods of praise, but once that "right" is applied
in a prosecution for refusing to submit to military conscription, or a
minor's refusal to attend school, or possession of marijuana or ob-
scene literature, unanimity quickly dissolves.
Justices Brennan and Scalia famously divided on this matter in Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D.114 At issue was the validity of a California statute
that conclusively presumed that a child born into an extant marriage
was fathered by the husband. In the case, an adulterous natural fa-
ther claimed that the statute deprived him of his fundamental liberty
to maintain a relationship with his child. In his dissent, Justice Bren-
nan characterized the relevant liberty interest as parenthood, while
Justice Scalia maintained that the interest at issue was "the power of
the natural father to assert parental rights over a child bom into a
woman's existing marriage with another man. 11 5  Justice Scalia
charged that the level of generality chosen by Justice Brennan-
parenthood-was not derived from any constant principle but was
free-floating. 6 By contrast, Justice Scalia contended that the level of
generality at which to frame an asserted liberty interest should be by
reference "to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition pro-
tectin, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identi-
fied."' Reference to the most specific tradition available, however,
heightens the risk that the Constitution becomes "a stagnant, archaic,
hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a
time long past."'' 8
Second, no matter how specific or general the traditions to which
one refers, there is the problem of dealing with the dynamic nature
of historical tradition. As the second Justice Harlan put it in Poe v.
Ullman,"9 the liberties protected by substantive due process represent:
[T] he balance which our Nation ... has struck between... liberty [of
the individual] and the demands of organized society .... having regard
114 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
115 Id. at 125.
116 Id. at 127 n.6. Justice Scalia challenged Justice Brennan's characterization of the relevant
liberty:
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition
regarding the natural father's rights vis-A-vis a child whose mother is married to another
man, Justice Brennan would choose to focus instead upon "parenthood." Why should
the relevant category not be even more general-perhaps "family relationships"; or "per-
sonal relationships"; or even "emotional attachments in general"?
Id.
I117 Id.
118 Id. at 141 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
119 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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to ... the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.
... [The liberty protected by due process] is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the [Bill of Rights]. It is a rational contin-
uum which ... includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints and which also recognizes•., that cer-
tain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgement.120
However, even if we accept Justice Harlan's invitation to conceptual-
ize our historical tradition as a constantly changing, continually up-
dated video record rather than as faded snapshots in a dusty national
photo album, we are confronted with the problem of assessing the
propriety of judicial initiative in identifying which claimed liberty in-
terests are the "certain interests" that "require particularly careful
scrutiny of the state's needs asserted to justify their abridgement."
2 1
Again, Justice Harlan expounds: "No formula could serve as a substi-
tute, in this area, for judgment and restraint."
22
Although this task is exceedingly difficult, recall that this is what is
required to identify constitutionally fundamental liberty interests,
those that are presumptively beyond governmental regulation. How-
ever abstract Justice Harlan's formulation of the job may be, and
however general the doctrinal formula established by Washington v.
Glucksberg,123 identifying fundamental liberties is not the most chal-
lenging analytical task. The difficulty of identifying fundamental lib-
erties pales in comparison to that of identifying those nonfundamen-
tal liberties that, nonetheless, demand heightened judicial scrutiny,
and of determining when there are no conceivable legitimate gov-
ernmental interests which interfere with nonfundamental liberties
that do not trigger any heightened scrutiny. It may be that the liberty
interest at issue in Lawrence2 4 is really a nonfundamental liberty, like
abortion, that triggers heightened scrutiny, but the Court surely did
not tell us what level of scrutiny should be delivered or the nature of
that scrutiny. Or, it may be that the nonfundamental liberty at issue
in Lawrence is preparing for future launch as a full-fledged fundamen-
tal liberty interest. If so, that design is carefully concealed from pub-
lic view. Even if Lawrence is the substantive due process equivalent of
Moreno, in which the Court declared that "a bare ... desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
120 Id. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 543.
1 Id. at 542.
123 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (declaring that substantive due process analysis requires a specific
assertion of the fundamental liberty interest at issue).
124 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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governmental interest' 25 for equal protection purposes, the problem
remains that a legislative desire to back morality by law is not axio-
matically a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group. A link
is missing in the Lawrence rationale: there is no demonstration that
Texas's desire to express moral disapproval by criminal sanctions was
motivated by a desire to harm gays and lesbians. The Court assumed
that this was so, and I am quite willing to make the same assumption,
but the Court should at least articulate its basis for making that as-
sumption. It would not be difficult to do. Texas formerly criminal-
ized all forms of oral and anal sexual intimacies; its selective crimi-
nalization of these practices when engaged in only by partners of the
same sex is of recent vintage. Just as with cases of disparate impact,
which invite us to probe legislative motivation by examining the cir-
cumstantial evidence surrounding the government decision that has
produced a disparate racial or sexual impact, 2 1 the Court should have
openly engaged in this weighing of the circumstantial evidence of
legislative motive.
Finally, it is possible thatJustice Kennedy's approach in Lawrence is
a diluted version of the approach taken by Randy Barnett. Professor
Barnett urges that a government should always be required to bear
the burden of proving an adequate justification for its regulations
that inhibit people's liberties, whether those liberties are character-
ized as trivial, minor, major, fundamental, or something else. 28 This
is, of course, a departure from our traditional presumption that gov-
ernmental action is lawful. Professor Barnett is quite right to assert
that the federal government, as a government of limited and enu-
merated powers, ought to be required to demonstrate the source of
its authority each time it exercises power that interferes with the peo-
ple's liberties. Though that proposition would seem to flow almost
ineluctably from the constitutional structure, it is in fact regarded as a
bit radical. On the other hand, states are presumed to have a general
police power-the power to act for the public welfare-unless the
125 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
26 See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App. 2001) ("For most of its history, Texas
has deemed deviate sexual intercourse, i.e., sodomy, to be unlawful whether performed by per-
sons of the same or different sex."); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1943)
("A person commits an offense if he engages in deviant sexual intercourse with another indi-
vidual of the same sex."); 1925 VERNON'S AINN. PEN. CODE, art. 524 (outlawing sodomy); TEX.
PEN. CODE, tit. 10, art. 507 (1911) (prohibiting sodomy committed with "mankind" in general).
In 1973, the Texas legislature amended its penal code to eliminate the criminal sanctions at-
tached to heterosexual sodomy between consenting adults. Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 353.
127 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (identi-
fying relevant factors to consider in assessing government motive in taking action that produces
a racially disparate impact); Pets. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (adopting the same ap-
proach as Arlington in reviewing government action that produces a sexually disparate impact).
128 BARNE'rI, supra note 4, at 253-69.
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specific exercise of that power contravenes federal law (including the
Constitution) or is denied under the state's own law (including its
constitution). Barnett argues that any exercise of state or federal
power should be presumed to interfere with the liberty of citizens
and, thus, must be justified by the government. In a highly diluted
form, Justice Kennedy and the Court may have adopted a variation
on Barnett's theme. If it turns out that a government's interest in
morality is sufficient to uphold some regulations of sexual or other
behavior under minimal scrutiny (perhaps a law prohibiting cruelty
to animals is one such possibility), we are left speculating even more
about the nature and scope of the liberty interest protected in Law-
rence.
At bottom, Lawrence raises many questions about the nature of
tiered scrutiny in substantive due process, and provides a discrete and
welcome answer to one particular issue. We know that states may not
criminalize intimate sexual behavior between mutually consenting
adults in some (but perhaps not all) circumstances, and that it cannot
legitimately regulate such behavior for the simple reason that it
wishes to use criminal law as the vehicle to deliver its message of
moral disapproval. Beyond that, we are now uncertain about the util-
ity (and, to some extent, even the effect) of identifying any given lib-
erty as fundamental, quasi-fundamental, nonfundamental but still
special, or just plain old nonfundamental, to say nothing of the un-
certainty of the process by which we classify liberties. Not only do we
lack a Linnaeus to devise a coherent system of classification, the re-
sults of any classification we do make are unstable, uncertain, and
unpredictable.
III. GRU7TERAND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STRICT SCRUTINY
In Grutter v. Bollinger,29 the Court revealed its ambivalence about
racial preferences. In doing so, it distorted and weakened the force
of strict scrutiny in equal protection and, by implication, in other ar-
eas of constitutional law in which strict scrutiny is applicable. At issue
was the validity of the University of Michigan Law School's admission
policy that sought to enroll a "critical mass" of "students from groups
which have been historically discriminated against, like African-
Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans"-" in order to reap "t.e
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.".' The
Court reiterated that the equal protection guarantee protects
12 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
130 Id. at 2332 (quoting the law school's admissions policy).
131 Id. at 2339.
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"'persons, not groups'" 32 and that "all governmental uses of race are
subject to strict scrutiny.""' Applying that familiar principle, the
Court concluded that Michigan's use of race was narrowly tailored to
further the law school's compelling objective of "attaining a diverse
student body."03 4 If that was all that the Grutter Court did, it would be
subject to criticism for engaging in the crudest of tautologies: While
governmental use of race is presumptively void, governments may use
race to further their compelling objective of parceling out govern-
ment benefits by reference to race, the very practice that is presump-
tively void. In Grutter, however, the Court recognized that Michigan's
use of race to achieve racial diversity was compelling only because at-
taining a critical mass of Michigan law students from historically dis-
advantaged minority groups was "at the heart of the Law School's
proper institutional mission.'' The Court deferred to the "Law
School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission." 6 While the Court claimed that its "scrutiny of
the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into
account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily
within the expertise of the university,"' ' it proceeded to accept at face
value the contention that student body racial diversity "promotes
learning outcomes,' '3 acquisition of "the skills needed in today's in-
creasingly global marketplace,"13 9 and the cultivation of "leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry"'4 ° through "path [s] to leader-
ship [that are] visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity." 4' While the Court may well be correct in
thinking that these effects are produced by race-based admissions
policies that favor historically disadvantaged minorities, the cost of
these policies is surely relevant to any serious discussion of the com-
pelling nature of the government objective in adopting racially pref-
erential admissions policies. The Court failed to discuss the possibil-
ity that racial preferences in admissions to public universities will
perpetuate racial consciousness, engender new racial resentments
and inflame old ones, undermine the very legitimacy it thinks such
admissions policies will produce, and deprive some individuals of
public benefits on the basis of their race. On balance, these costs
132 Id. at 2337 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
'33 Id. at 2338.
134 Id. at 2339.
15 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
18 Id. at 2340.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2341.
141 Id.
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
may not be enough to disturb the Court's conclusion that a racially
diverse student body in public universities is a compelling interest of
government, but they are surely deserving of discussion when judges
attempt to grapple with the slippery and explosive question of when
governmental use of race might be justified by some compelling in-
terest.
To place the Grutter brand of strict scrutiny in context, consider
Korematsu v. United States,4' the most famous (and, to most contempo-
rary observers, infamous) case in which the Court upheld a racial
classification under the precursor to today's strict scrutiny.1
43 It is fa-
miliar, if uncomfortable, history that in 1942 the United States Army
ordered the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the
West Coast. This forcible relocation and incarceration of thousands
of innocent civilians was upheld as constitutionally valid in Korematsu.
The Court's opinion is hardly a model of analytical clarity, a failing
that makes it difficult to supply a conscientious and accurate reading
of its rationale. Justice Black began the majority opinion with his
now-familiar declaration that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect....
[C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny,' ' 44 but he did
not press this implicit equal protection inquiry any further. Instead,
the Court's apparent concern was with the scope of the war power;
accordingly, the Court concluded that "we are unable to conclude
that it was beyond the war power.., to exclude those of Japanese an-
cestry from the West Coast war area [in 1942]."' The Court ob-
scured the crucial point, however, for nobody was seriously claiming
that the issue was the scope of the war power without taking into con-
sideration other constitutional rights that trump governmental pow-
ers. In dissent, Justice Murphy expressed the problem clearly:
[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of
the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process
of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other in-
terests reconciled....
142 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
143 A few commentators (and judges) defend Korematsu. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 203-11 (1998) (arguing that certain distinc-
tions mitigate in favor of treating enemy aliens differently in times of war); Pamela Karlan &
Richard Posner, The Triumph of Expedience, HARPER'S MAG., May 2001, at 31, 37, 39 (reporting
Posner's characterization of the result as "defensible" and Karlan's characterization of Korematsu
as "disastrous law"). At least one commentator critical of Korematsu makes the claim that Kore-
matsu did not "apply heightened judicial review," much less strict scrutiny. See Neil Gotanda,
The Story of Korematsu: TheJapanese-American Cases, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249, 271
(Michael Doff ed., 2003). As will be made plain from the text following this note, I disagree
with Professor Gotanda's reading of Korematsu.
144 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
145 Id. at 217-18.
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The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military
necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his constitutional
rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger
that is so "immediate, imminent, and impending" as not to admit of de-
lay.., of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger. 46
To Justice Murphy, the specific constitutional liberty at stake was no
less clear: "Being an obvious racial discrimination, the order deprives
all those within its scope of the e[Tual protection of the laws as guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment."
However much Justice Black and his colleagues in the majority
may have wished to avoid addressing the equal protection problem, it
was unavoidable. While the Court chose not to discuss the elephant
in the room in its opinion, Justice Murphy's dissent exposed it, and
the Court's decision that the exclusion order was a valid exercise of
the war power suggests the conclusion that the Court found the equal
protection elephant insufficiently weighty to disturb the military or-
der. Of course, the Court did not discuss the precise standard of re-
view it applied to this matter, which is, therefore, debatable; its out-
lines, however, can be picked from Justice Black's opinion. First, the
Court required the government to establish its compelling reason for
the exclusion: "Nothing short of... the gravest imminent danger to
the public safety can constitutionally justify [the exclusion] ."4s Sec-
ond, the Court approved the exclusion as necessary to the accom-
plishment of the compelling reason of public safety by noting that
"exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed necessary because
of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of
the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this coun-
try." The reason Korematsu horrifies us, and caused Justice Jackson
to characterize it as a "loaded weapon, is not that the Court chose
to apply minimal scrutiny to a wretched instance of governmental ra-
cial discrimination, but that the Court applied an early version of
strict scrutiny to validate what has been exposed by time as a mam-
moth wrong. How did it do this? The unpleasant answer is that it
employed much the same method as the Grutter majority. In both Ko-
rematsu and Grutter, the Court deferred to the relevant government
decision makers' judgment as to the compelling nature of the gov-
ernment's objective. A repeated theme in Korematsu is the Court's
146 Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
623, 628 (1871)).
147 Id. at 234-35. Justice Murphy thus anticipated doctrine that would proclaim ten years
later in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which held that discrimination may violate due
process under the Fifth Amendment.
148 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (majority opinion).
149 Id. at 218-19.
150 Id. at 246 (Jackson,J., dissenting).
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refusal to second-guess the military's judgment: "' [t]he mili-
tary... ordered exclusion," 51 and "we cannot reject as unfounded
[that] judgment.", 52 The Court then rationalized that "[t]he judg-
ment that exclusion ... was... a military imperative answers the con-
tention that the exclusion was in the nature of group punishment
based on antagonism to those of Japanese origin." 53 The Court in
Korematsu concluded: "[T] he military authorities considered that the
need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot-by avail-
ing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at
that time these actions were unjustified."'5 4
So, too, did the Court in Grutter repeatedly sound the theme of
deference:
The Law School's educational judgment... is one to which we de-
fer.... Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a de-
gree of deference to a university's academic decisions ....
... [U]niversities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradi-
tion .... Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest
in a diverse student body is informed by our view... that "good faith" on
the part of a university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the con-
trary."
The Court in Korematsu was apparently as confident as the Court in
Grutter that good faith on the part of the government could be pre-
sumed: "Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that they should
have the power to [incarcerate those of Japanese ancestry] .156 That
confidence was horribly misplaced in Korematsu. Although the con-
sequences of misplacing confidence in the racially motivated deci-
sions of university admissions officers are probably far less significant
than the consequences of misplacing confidence in the racially moti-
vated decisions of military leaders, it ought to be of concern that the
Court in Grutter revived the Korematsu brand of strict scrutiny. 57 If
151 Id. at 218 (majority opinion).
152 Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
153 Id. at 219.
154 Id. at 223-24.
15 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
1 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added).
157 While it should go without saying that any wrongful act of racial discrimination by a gov-
ernment is reprehensible and produces consequences of grave significance to the affected vic-
tim, the point needs to be repeated because the wrongful discrimination that would result from
less-than-good-faith admissions decisions is likely to be largely obscured from public view. Jus-
tice Ginsburg more-or-less acknowledged as much in her dissent to Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2411 (2003), the companion case to Grutter. "Michigan's [openly racial] College affirmative
action program is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.
Id. at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Further, she stated, "Among constitutionally permissible
options, those that candidly disclose their consideration of race seem to me preferable to those
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Korematsu's legacy was the creation of a loaded weapon lying about
for ready use by any unscrupulous wielder of power and manipulator
of public sentiment, Grutter offers the disquieting promise of another
loaded weapon, albeit one of smaller caliber, lying about in the con-
stitutional closet.
Paradoxically, none of this is to say that the result in Grutter was
wrong. There can be legitimate debate on the policy wisdom of the
result in Grutter, but that debate is not the focus of this Article. The
problem with Grutter is its formalistic method. The Court sought to
serve two mutually inconsistent ends: On one hand, it renewed its
firm commitment to the unyielding principle that all uses of race by
government are subject to strict scrutiny; on the other hand, it implic-
itly recognized (but refused to expressly acknowledge) that some uses
of race are considerably more invidious than others, and explicitly
recognized that some uses of race are not wrongful at all.
This dichotomy results from a larger dichotomy in equal protec-
tion with respect to race. At times, we subscribe to the notion that
"[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,",5 8 and that the cardinal principle
of equal protection with respect to race is eradication of racial con-
sciousness. Yet with equal fervor, we endorse the notion: "There is
no caste here. Our Constitution... neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.' 59 This notion leads us ineluctably to the
conclusion that the first command of equal protection, with respect
to race, is to eliminate the subordination and oppression that came
with our racial caste system. Sometimes, as with the first Justice
Harlan's dissent in Pessy v. Ferguson,'6° or with the Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,'6 1 these two aims coincide. Other times,
however, as in race-based affirmative action, the two aims diverge.
The Court in Grutter tried to bridge the chasm created by that diver-
gence, but its methodology may prove to be as flawed as the first Ta-
coma Narrows bridge. 62
that conceal it." Id. at n.11. Of course, "Michigan's [openly racial] College affirmative action
program" turned out not to be a constitutionally permissible option, thus raising the specter
that constitutionally impermissible racial discrimination might occur via "winks, nods, and dis-
guises."
15 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 552-64 (disputing the Court's holding that a state statute mandating separate public
accommodations for different races did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation in public education by holding that
the doctrine of "separate but equal" violates the Equal Protection Clause).
162 Between November 1938 and July 1940, the third longest suspension bridge in the world
and the world's longest center span suspension bridge (at the time) was constructed spanning
the Tacoma Narrows, a body of water dividing Tacoma from the Olympic Peninsula. Opened
to traffic on July 1, 1940, the bridge immediately began to sway and vibrate. On November 7,
1940, these wind-induced vibrations became so severe that the bridge began to twist radically.
May 20041
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Rather than justify race-based admissions to public universities
under the rubric that such racial policies serve a compelling interest,
the Grutter Court would have been more forthright had it revived Jus-
tice Brennan's view that "benign" racial classifications trigger inter-
mediate scrutiny, but malignant ones should trigger strict scrutiny.
This approach, first voiced in Bakke163 and later briefly adopted by the
Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC" as the standard for evaluat-
ing racial classifications used by the federal government, openly tilts
toward the anti-subordination principle. The Court's recognition of
racial diversity in public universities as a compelling state government
interest also embraces the anti-subordination principle. However,
the mechanism of the embrace-facial employment of strict scrutiny
coupled with frank deference to the government decision makers
who use race as a classifying device-imposes costs that might be
avoided if the Court were to overtly declare its acceptance of a two-
tiered level of review for racial classifications. To be sure, the under-
lying problem does not disappear. Under the Brennan formula, the
pivotal debate occurs at the point at which courts must determine
whether the governmental use of race at issue is benign or malignant.
The resolution of that issue depends on the degree to which the ra-
cial classification reinforces or undermines the vestiges of our racial
caste system. The conceptual paradigm of the Brennan approach is
unadulterated anti-subordination. By contrast, the Grutter formula
depends on a showing that the government has some paramount,
overwhelmingly important reason for using race. But the Grutter
Court's deference to the decision maker's presumed good faith
makes that showing a relatively easy task for the government, at least
in the university admissions context.
With the acid sting of Korematsu in its memory, will the Court be
so quick to defer to the judgment of the President's national security
advisors when racial, religious, or ethnic classifications are employed
in the defense of the nation against terror attacks? Is prevention of
another catastrophe of World Trade Center proportion less compel-
ling than the laudable but diffuse goal of racial justice? If university
admissions officers can be trusted to exercise good faith in their ra-
cially tinged decisions, can the beat cop or the city manager be
Within a few minutes, the center span broke apart and collapsed. An illustrated history of the
bridge may be found at http://www.lib.washington.edu/specialcoll/tnb (last modified Oct. 25,
2002). Other photos, including an MPEG file containing video imagery of the collapse, may be
found at http://www.civeng.carleton.ca/Exhibits/TacomaNarrows (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
163 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (advocating the use of in-
termediate scrutiny to evaluate "racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes").
1 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold "benign" classifications
based on race, which endeavored to enhance diversity in broadcasting by treating minority-
controlled applicants for broadcast licenses with preference).
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similarly trusted? Perhaps the answers to these questions, after Grut-
ter, are "yes," "no," and "yes." But, it is at least equally likely that the
answers are "no," "yes," and "no." There is now a plasticity to the
method of strict scrutiny that invites these and a host of other diffi-
cult-to-answer questions. The Court has created a ritual as empty of
substance as many liturgies: In Grutter, we are asked to recite the
creed of color-blindness by murmuring the mantra of strict scrutiny,
but then to profess our faith in the righteousness of the academic
mandarins that will act to overcome racial subordination and, in so
doing, eviscerate the mantra we just uttered. Put more generally, as
we chant the mantra of strict scrutiny even as we profess our faith in
those whose decisions we have recited, we must scrutinize with the
utmost care and skepticism. What is to prevent this loaded weapon of
the new liturgy of strict scrutiny from being employed in any context
in which prior doctrine has insisted upon strict scrutiny?
Of course, strict scrutiny is not only about the presence of compel-
ling government interests and the method by which we determine
their presence or absence. The other half of the stereoscopic glare
that comprises strict scrutiny probes the necessity of using a suspect
classification to achieve the government's compelling interest, a task
that the Court usually describes as determinative of whether the clas-
sification is narrowly tailored to fit the compellin interest.•6 5 Grutter,
along with its companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger,16 paid even more at-
tention to this aspect of strict scrutiny than to the question of
whether racial diversity in public universities constituted a compelling
interest of governments. In Grutter, the essence of narrow tailoring,
in the context of achieving the goal of diversity in public university
admissions, was individualized consideration of each applicant. Such
individualized consideration involves a process in which race is "used
in a flexible, nonmechanical way" but not to "establish quotas" or to
create "separate admissions tracks.' 67 Of "paramount" concern to
the Court was "individualized consideration" of each applicant; the
totality of each applicant's life must be evaluated, "and not in a way
165 In Shaw v. Hunt, the Court described narrow tailoring as the use of means that are "'spe-
cifically and narrowly framed to accomplish [the government's compelling] purpose.'" 517 U.S.
899, 908 (1996) (holding that congressional redistricting which allegedly gerrymandered along
racial lines violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986)).
The purpose of narrow tailoring has been described as ensuring "that there is little or no possi-
bility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." City
of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (reviewing a pol-
icy of awarding contracts to minority businesses under strict scrutiny, and holding record evi-
dence of specific past discrimination sufficient, but finding that the plan was not narrowly tai-
lored to remedy the effects of past discrimination).
166 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
167 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003).
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that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his
or her application.'"' Gratz reinforced this notion by striking down
the undergraduate admissions policy of the University of Michigan,
which sought to achieve diversity by awarding "mechanical, prede-
termined diversity 'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity."1 69 So long as
diversity (a compelling objective of public universities) includes racial
diversity (which it does), there can surely be little quarrel with this
formulation of the narrow tailoring requirement.
The problem, however, lies in the application of the formula.
First, the Court in Grutter largely ignored statistical data that im-
peached the law school's assertion that race was only one among
many factors in assembling a diverse student body.170 Second, while
the Court stated that narrow tailoring "require [s] serious, good faith
consideration of workable, race-neutral alternatives that will achieve
the diversity the university seeks," 171 it rejected the notion that narrow
tailoring "require[s] exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative.' 7T To the extent this means only that a government need
not burden itself with fanciful and unworkable race-neutral alterna-
tives, it is surely unremarkable. But, if this means that a government
need only consider (but not necessarily adopt) workable, race-neutral
alternatives, the standard articulated for narrow tailoring has as-
sumed a surprisingly deferential posture toward government decision
makers. However, given the deference to government decision mak-
ers the Court displayed in Grutter with respect to evaluating claimed
compelling government interests, it should not come as a surprise to
learn that similar deference informs judicial assessment of the tailor-
ing of means to ends. Nor is there any doubt concerning the degree
168 Id. at 2343.
9 Id. Michigan's undergraduate admissions system was based on a point system in which 20
points were awarded to applicants who were members of an "'underrepresented minority'
group, as defined by the University." Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428. This "automatic distribution of
20 points has the effect of making 'the factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally
qualified underrepresented minority applicant," id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (alteration in original)), and thus established that it failed the narrow tailor-
ing prong of strict scrutiny. Id. at 2430.
170 Tables 1 through 3 of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion displayed an uncom-
monly precise correlation between the percentage of applicants of any given underrepresented
ethnicity and the percentage of admitted applicants of that ethnicity. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at
2368-69 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The inference ChiefJustice Rehnquist drew was that this
"must result from careful race based planning by the Law School" to ensure "that the propor-
tion of each group admitted should be the same as the proportion of that group in the appli-
cant pool." Id. at 2369. Similarly, Justice Kennedy argued in his dissent that the percentage of
matriculated students who were members of the law school's desired racial groups was consis-
tent with "an inference that the Law School's pursuit of critical mass mutated into the
equivalent of a quota." Id. at 2371 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2372 (displaying data
from which Justice Kennedy drew his inference).
171 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (majority opinion).
172 Id. at 2344.
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of deference Grutter displayed to government decision makers in as-
sessing this tailoring: "We take the Law School at its word that it
would 'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions
formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable."7 ' The asserted consequences of such deference
are discussed by Justice Kennedy and reflected in his summary of the
trial testimony of the law school's former admissions director: "He
testified that faculty members were 'breathtakingly cynical' in decid-
ing who would qualify as underrepresented minorities. An example
he offered was faculty debate as to whether Cubans should be
counted as Hispanics: One professor objected on the grounds that
Cubans were Republicans.' 7 4 This will not surprise any honest legal
academician; it is virtually mandatory that any law professor profess
his or her faith in the necessity of racial diversity. Dissenters are
shunned at best and labeled racists at worst. If there can be no dis-
passionate consideration of the matter among American law profes-
sors, how believable is the law school's profession that it would like
nothing better than to use a race-neutral admissions formula to
achieve diversity?
By even raising this question I risk being perceived as hostile to
diversity, blind to the claims of racial justice, ignorant of the contin-
ued effects of our racially oppressive history, and possibly a closet rac-
ist. I am acquitted of those charges by those who know me, and I
raise the issue because I do not wish to be misunderstood: The harm
wrought by Grutter lies in its pretense that it applied strict scrutiny,
not in its validation of the use of race in admissions to public univer-
sities. Grutter, unmasked, stands for the forthright proposition that
government uses of race which do not reinforce the lingering effects
of past racial oppression are entitled to less skeptical review than
those uses of race that perpetuate the effects of our past racial injus-
tices. That was the proposition which Justice Brennan championed
in Metro Broadcasting."5 Perhaps, at bottom, Grutter is little more than
a judicial compromise; five votes could not be mustered for overt en-
dorsement of the Brennan view, but could be assembled for an ersatz
173 Id. at 2346 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 34).
174 Id. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court held:
[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress---even if those measures are
not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmen-
tal or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they
serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.
Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (advocating the use of intermediate scrutiny to evaluate "racial classifications
designed to further remedial purposes").
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version. But ersatz versions of anything are rarely satisfying and never
enduring. In the end, Grutter is a Pyrrhic victory if ever there was one,
for the lingering costs of adherence to a formulaic facade will, in
time, manifest themselves in the collapse of the structure behind the
facade.
IV. FRUIT OF THE FORMALISTIC TREE: WHITHER TIERED SCRUTINY?
The premise of tiered scrutiny has been that the judiciary can
identify those government actions which do not merit the usual pre-
sumption of constitutional validity. The ways of doing so have been
varied but have primarily included identification of suspicious classi-
fications and fundamental liberties. Tiered scrutiny has been refined
by subdividing suspicious classifications into suspect ones (that re-
ceive strict scrutiny),176 and semi-suspect ones (that receive so-called
intermediate scrutiny) , and by parsing the lexicon of liberties into
fundamental ones (that receive strict scrutiny) ,17 and quasi-
fundamental ones (that receive, in each instance, a sui generis form
of heightened, but not strict, scrutiny).'79 Tiered scrutiny has always
had a somewhat artificial air of precision to it, because the criteria for
sorting classifications and liberties into the appropriate bins has been
flexible (to put it charitably), or so amorphous as to approach the
illusory (to phrase it cynically). In any case, the supposed criteria
have never been applied consistently. Yet, tiered scrutiny has sur-
vived. Perhaps tiered scrutiny resembles Winston Churchill's charac-
terization of democracy as the worst form of government except for
all the others, s° but neither democracy nor tiered scrutiny is invul-
nerable to attack from without or to collapse from within.
The challenge posed to tiered scrutiny by Lawrence and Grutter is
whether the Court's embrace of formalism will eventually rot the
form. The minimal scrutiny that Lawrence formally applied was hardly
176 See supra text accompanying notes 8-11, 15-19.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
179 Id. "Quasi-fundamental liberties" are an amorphous category that includes the right at
issue in Lawrence as well as such "enhanced minimal scrutiny" cases as Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
204 (1982) (holding that even though undocumented aliens are not a suspect class and educa-
tion is not a fundamental right, a Texas statute that restricted state funds from funding children
who were not legally admitted to the United States violated the Equal Protection Clause because
it did not further a "substantial goal of the State"); see supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
180 SeeTHE OXFORD DICTIONARYOF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979). On November 11, 1947,
Winston Churchill remarked to the House of Commons:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin
and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said
that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time.
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deferential to governments, and the strict scrutiny that Grutter for-
mally applied was remarkably deferential.' The lack of connection
between the form of the scrutiny employed and its application invites
speculation as to the underlying, unarticulated nature of the method
of review that may be evolving behind the formal facade of tiered
scrutiny.
Lawrence might be explained as a triumph of value skepticism.
The Court was unwilling to declare that adults have a constitutionally
fundamental right to engage privately in consensual sexual intimacies
that are a part of their larger personal relationship. The most the
Lawrence Court would do was acknowledge that this was a plain-vanilla
liberty, 82 presumably on par with the liberty to smoke tobacco in your
own living room, to lounge around your bedroom in an ugly dressing
gown, or to choose to have toast or a bagel with your morning coffee.
At first glance, one might think that this is a Court unwilling to de-
clare the existence of any enduring values, and that first impression
would initially be strengthened by the Court's conclusion that popu-
lar moral disapproval is not a legitimate state interest for purposes of
minimal scrutiny. Surely this Court must think that value choices are
inherently unstable, malleable, and undeserving of any presumptive
deference. That cannot suffice as an answer, however, for the result
of Lawrence is to stake out a value position in highly contested terri-
tory. By employing the appearance of value neutrality, the Court
made a value choice, but it simultaneously demeaned and blunted
the impact of that choice by refusing to identify strongly the value it
chose to protect.
Lest there be doubt on the point, consider the immediate after-
math of Lawrence. In the same term in which Lawrence was decided,
the Court remanded Limon v. Kansas s3 to the Court of Appeals of
Kansas for further consideration in light of Lawrence. Matthew Li-
mon, an eighteen-year-old adult, had been convicted of criminal sod-
omy for engaging in oral sex with a fourteen-year-old boy. Although
the Kansas criminal sodomy statute makes no distinction between
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy,8 4 another Kansas statute
carves out an exception to the criminal sodomy statute for heterosex-
ual sodomy involving a young adult and a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old
child, and punishes the latter conduct far less severely than criminal
sodomy185 On remand, the Court of Appeals of Kansas upheld
181 See discussion supra Parts III, IV.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
183 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003).
184 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a) (2) (1995) ("Criminal sodomy is... sodomy with a child
who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age .... ).
185 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a) (2) (2002 Supp.) In pertinent part, this statute defines:
(a) Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is engaging in voluntary:
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Limon's conviction and a greater-than-seventeen year prison sen-
tence imposed under the criminal statute.'86 Following Lawrence, the
Kansas court applied minimal scrutiny and upheld the statutes.18
Matthew Limon's reliance on Lawrence was dismissed because the
Lawrence liberty interest was confined to adults. According to the
Kansas court:
[T] he legislature could have reasonably determined that to prevent the
gradual deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a majority of
Kansans, it would encourage and preserve the traditional sexual mores of
society. Moreover, traditional sexual mores have played a significant role
in the sexual development of children. During early adolescence, chil-
dren are in the process of trying to figure out who they are. A part of
that process is learning and developing their sexual identity. As a result,
the legislature could well have concluded that homosexual sodomy be-
tween children and young adults could disturb the traditional sexual de-
velopment of children.
While the Kansas court also offered the legislature's hypothetical in-
terest in deterring the spread of disease through homosexual sexual
conduct as a legitimate interest to which the differential statutory
scheme was rationally related, 89 let us dwell on the first asserted in-
terest. Is encouragement of "traditional sexual mores" a different
and more legitimate interest than expressing moral disapproval? If
not, is moral disapproval illegitimate only when used to criminalize
private consensual sexual intimacies between adults? If neither of the
above questions can be answered affirmatively, the Kansas court
seems doomed to suffer a reversal of its judgment. In that event, note
once again how apparent value skepticism operates to reinforce and
flesh out the Court's value choices. It is not legitimate for a democ-
ratic community to write into law its moral judgments; only some
utilitarian harm-avoiding interest will suffice to establish legitimacy.
That, in itself, is a value judgment. Some value judgments (e.g., ma-
joritarian morality) are not legitimate but other value judgments are
legitimate (e.g., utilitarian harm avoidance). Moreover, the disquali-
fication of majoritarian morality as a legitimate interest of
(2) sodomy... with a child who is 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the
offender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years of age older than the child
and the child and the offender are the only parties involved and are members of the op-
posite sex.
Id.
186 State v. Limon, No. 85,898, 2004 Kan. App. LEXIS 110, at *32-33 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2004). The severity of the sentence was partly attributable to the fact that Limon had two prior
convictions of "aggravated criminal sodomy." Id. at *4.
187 Id. at *9 ("[T]he question to be answered is whether the challenged classification has a
rational basis.").
188 Id. at *18.
189 Id. at *21-22.
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government implicitly privileges other values (e.g., the liberty interest
of people to engage in private consensual sexual intimacies), and that
privileging constitutes an important value choice. Yet the latter value
is debased, even as it is protected, by the Court's refusal to recognize
it as fundamental and apply strict scrutiny to regulations that impinge
upon its exercise.
While these may be appropriate value judgments, there remain
several troubling questions about the process that produces these
judgments. What confers authority upon judicial judgment of the le-
gitimacy of majoritarian morality? If such judicial judgment is valid,
perhaps it is due to our tradition of judicial review that requires we
accept it as such when judges are called upon to adjudicate claims of
individual constitutional rights. Even if this is the case, however, why
is it that some nonfundamental liberties are effectively immune from
regulation while some quasi-fundamental liberties (e.g., abortion) are
subject to regulations (as long as the regulations do not create an
"undue burden")?19 ° Further, effective access to some fundamental
liberties (e.g., the assumed right to die) are subject to considerable
regulation because the access method itself is not deemed to be fun-
damental and the government's interest in regulating that access
method is rooted in utilitarian goals of harm avoidance? 9' If these
questions cannot be readily answered in a plausible, coherent, rea-
sonably succinct fashion, there is a strong likelihood that something
is radically amiss in the methodology that is producing these out-
comes. Substantive due process was under enough intellectual pres-
sure when it was a two-track system of fundamental rights coupled
with strict scrutiny, and nonfundamental rights coupled with minimal
scrutiny. Now that it seems to be resolving into a free-form system, it
may begin to bear uncomfortable resemblance to a shell game. It will
take some time, but perhaps less time than we think, for the judicial
methodology to be regarded as illegitimate, an unexplained choice of
values made by judges who claim to be agnostic as to values.
The irony of Lawrence is that the language of the opinion is wholly
inconsistent with value skepticism. Justice Kennedy repeatedly em-
phasized the "respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of
the person,"' the need to eradicate the "stigma" of criminal penal-
ties attached to private consensual sex by adult homosexuals, P. the
190 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that the state may not place an undue burden on a woman's attempt to obtain an abortion
before a fetus reaches viability).
191 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that "the asserted 'right'
to [doctor] assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause").
192 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
193 Id. at 2482.
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importance of avoiding any "invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres,"
194
and the necessity of eliminating "precedent [that] demeans the lives
of homosexual persons."195 With that build-up, one would expectJus-
tice Kennedy to conclude that the liberty interest that was the object
of such solicitude was fundamental. Lawrence is a judicial souffl6 with
a puffy crown that collapsed upon removal from the oven.
Further evidence of the unstable nature of Lawrence is provided by
the use to which it was put by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.9 6 In Goodridge I, the
court held that statutory barriers to same-sex marriage violated the
due process and equality guarantees of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion. In doing so, the court noted that in Lawrence the United
States Supreme Court had ruled that the Federal Constitution "pro-
hibits a State from wielding its formidable power to regulate conduct
in a manner that demeans basic human dignity, even though that
statutory discrimination may enjoy broad public support.""" In
another passage, the court pointed out that in Lawrence the Supreme
Court had also "affirmed that the core concept of common human
dignity protected by the... United States Constitution precludes
government intrusion into the deeply personal realms of consensual
adult expressions of intimacy and one's choice of an intimate part-
ner."'9 While the court did not ground its decision on federal law, it
used Lawrence to stand for a broader proposition than it would appear
Lawrence can support. Given that Lawrence found the interests quoted
by the Goodridge I majority not to be fundamental, it is an overstate-
ment to assert flatly that Lawrence held that the Constitution simply
forbids government action that "demeans basic human dignity" or
that impinges upon "consensual adult expressions of intimacy and
one's choice of an intimate partner." Indeed, if we take Lawrence at
face value, these interests may presumptively be validly regulated by
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) ("Goodridge 1r). In Goodridge I, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ruled that barring same-sex couples from civil marriage violated the equality and
due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, but stayed the effectiveness of its deci-
sion for 180 days to permit the legislature to cure the constitutional defect. Id. at 970. Follow-
ing that decision, the legislature used Massachusetts's certification procedure to ask the court
whether civil unions for same-sex couples would comply with the equality guarantee. Civil un-
ions would confer upon same-sex couples joined in civil union all the status benefits of marriage
but not the name. In Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, No. SJC-09163, 2004 Mass. LEXIS 35
(Mass. Feb. 3, 2004) ("Goodridge IF), the court said that only marriage, not a clone with a differ-
ent name, would satisfy the Massachusetts Constitution.
197 798 N.E.2d at 948.
198 Id. at 958 n.17.
199 Id. at 948.
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governments. The problem in Lawrence was that the only interest as-
serted by Texas to support its sodomy law was moral disapproval, an
illegitimate government interest.
In Goodridge I, as in Lawrence, the court applied minimal scrutiny
and proceeded to reject three interests asserted by Massachusetts to
support limiting marriage to the union of a man and a woman." °' It is
hardly clear whether the first interest, "providing a 'favorable setting
for procreation,' 2 0 1 was insufficient because it was illegitimate or be-
cause the marriage limitation was not rationally related to its accom-
plishment. We learn that procreation is not "a necessary component
of civil marriage, 202 that "a narrow focus [on procreation] is inappro-
priate,,20 3 and that "It]he 'marriage is procreation' argument singles
out the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples .... [and thus] confers an official stamp of approval on
the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy
of respect., 20 4 From this, one might guess that the government inter-
est is illegitimate, for the court cannot quite bring itself to state out-
right that the interest is not rationally related to the marriage limita-
tion at issue. The second claimed government interest, "ensuring the
optimal setting for child rearing, 05 was acknowledged to be legiti-
mate,00 but limiting "marria, e to opposite-sex couples ... cannot
plausibly further this policy"20 because of the wide differences that
exist in the composition of families engaged in raising children. 0
The third asserted interest, "conserving scarce State and private
financial resources,"20 9 while legitimate, was not rationally served by
the marriage limitation because there was neither empirical nor legal
evidence to support the contention that "same-sex couples are more
financially independent than married couples and thus less needy of
public marital benefits." 210 As in Lawrence, the form of the scrutiny
was minimal, but its substance was something else. If there is no pre-
sumptive invalidity to Massachusetts's statutory limitation of marriage
to heterosexual unions, and if any "conceivable, rational basis" will
200 Id. at 961.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 962 (emphasis added).203 Id. (emphasis added).
24 Id.
205 Id. at 961.
206 Id. at 962 ("Protecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy.").
207 Id.
208 Id. at 962-64 (discussing the varying circumstances and composition of the American fam-
ily over time).
209 Id. at 964.
210 Id.
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suffice to validate a law challenged under minimal scrutiny,"' surely it
is rational (even if dubious) for a state government to think that it
might wish to limit marriage to heterosexual unions in order to en-
courage the raising of children in the traditional family structure.
Many other family structures exist, of course, and there are plenty of
heterosexual traditional families that do a lousy job of raising chil-
dren, but if courts really believe in minimal scrutiny, it is for legisla-
tures to make this judgment, so long as there is a smidgen of rational-
ity in it. Now, lest I be misunderstood as yet another reflexive
opponent of same-sex unions, I will clearly state that I think that de-
nial of the status benefits of marriage to same-sex couples is demean-
ing to their relationships and maintains a structural inequality that is
hurtful, financially damaging, and invites other wrongful abuse. But
if the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge I truly be-
lieved this, why is it that these relationships are not presumptively in-
sulated from government attack, rather than presumptively vulner-
able to regulation? If the Supreme Court in Lawrence truly believed
that criminal prohibition of adult private, consensual sexual intima-
cies conducted in the context of a larger personal relationship "de-
mean [s the very] existence" of the sexual partners, 1' how can it be
that such criminal prohibitions are, nevertheless, presumptively valid?
Either the Supreme Court in Lawrence and the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court in Goodridge I do not believe that the liberties
they describe are as significant as they claim, or they do not believe in
the level of scrutiny they purport to apply. Neither possibility is at-
tractive; each is disquieting. The former proposition is not plausible,
because the government action at issue would presumably have been
upheld if the courts secretly devalued the liberties they espoused.
Thus, the latter proposition is more likely. It may be that the courts
in Lawrence and Goodridge I were testing public opinion by floating a
"weak" liberty, but that seems unlikely in the case of Goodridge I,• • •213
given the aroused reaction it produced. It is a more plausible
211 See Fine v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 518 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Mass. 1988) ("In analyz-
ing equal protection claims, this court has held that statutes which do not involve either a sus-
pect group or a fundamental right only need to be supported by a conceivable, rational basis.").
2 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
213 See, for example, the text of the constitutional amendment proposed by the House of
Representatives, which reads:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon unmarried couples or groups.
H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Press Release, Office of the President Calls for Con-
stitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004) (endorsing a constitutional
amendment), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-
2.html.
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explanation of Lawrence The Court in Lawrence might have thought
that a ringing endorsement of a "weak" liberty would bring the judi-
cial and legislative pots to a boil on the larger issue of recognizing the
equal legal dignity of homosexuals and heterosexuals. If so, they
were right in their calculation, but at the cost of tossing the diffuse
and barely coherent doctrine of substantive due process into a judi-
cial magician's black hat. The Court will continue to select the values
that it will protect, but there can no longer even be the assurance of
vague appeals to history, tradition, conscience, and "ordered liberty"
to confine the value selection process.
Grutter reinforces the methodology of Lawrence. By attempting to
adhere to both prongs of the equal protection dilemma-a commit-
ment to color-blindness and also to the principle of eradicating racial
subordination-it damaged the vessel of tiered scrutiny. The Court
was forced to make hard choices in Grutter, and so it proved again the
adage that hard cases make bad law. More accurately, it is bad
choices that make bad law. The obvious choice was to decide
whether racially based admission policies in public universities were
consistent with the equal protection guarantee. The somewhat veiled
choice was to decide whether color-blindness or anti-subordination
would be the reigning paradigm of equal protection with respect to
race, or whether the two could be fused in a weld that would last.
The apparently not-so-obvious issue was the effect on tiered scrutiny
of the Court's choice between color-blindness, anti-subordination, or
a fusion of the two.
Given the result-upholding the validity of racially based admis-
sions-the Court could have done one of three things: (1) continue
to hold that all racial classifications by governments are subject to
strict scrutiny and justify this classification as narrowly tailored to the
achievement of diversity; (2) adopt the rejected Brennan formula
that "benign" racial classifications are subject to intermediate scru-• 214
tiny; conclude that racially based admissions formulae are benign,
and uphold their use under intermediate scrutiny; or (3) rule that
214 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). The Court summa-
rized its holding:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress-even if those
measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the ex-
tent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and
are substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
Id. (footnote omitted); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Bren-
nan, WAhite, Marshall, Blackmun,jJ., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[R]acial classifications designed to further remedial purposes '"must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,"'"
(quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)))).
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this racial classification is subject to some lesser degree of scrutiny
(but not because it is "benign") and articulate a principle that justi-
fies a lesser degree of scrutiny without embracing the benign-malign
distinction endorsed by Justice Brennan. Of course, the Court
adopted the first course of action. 2' 5 No doubt it rejected the second
choice because there was no majority for the open acceptance of anti-
subordination as the primary principle informing equal protection
and race. But, if the Court intended to craft a fusion of color-
blindness and anti-subordination (which surely seems to be the in-
tended result of its actual decision), it is unclear why it did not ex-
plore the third option.
The first option sacrificed the essence of strict scrutiny-stern ju-
dicial skepticism of government action-to forge an accommodation
between color-blindness and anti-subordination. The concession to
color-blindness was in the continued formal adherence to strict scru-
tiny;216 the embrace of anti-subordination was in the Court's deferen-
tial acceptance of both the government's claimed compelling interest
for using race and the necessity for using race to accomplish that in-
terest.217 Of course, the cost of this union of principles was paid by di-
luting strict scrutiny to the point of possible disutility.
The second option would have preserved the form and substance
of strict scrutiny, but would have required the Court to overtly ac-
knowledge the central importance of anti-subordination to equal
protection. As important as the anti-subordination principle may be,
it is still an open question whether in America's increasingly
pluralistic society of kaleidoscopic ethnicity, with each group's varied
historical experiences, the anti-subordination principle should be the
primary theoretical focus of equal protection. Resolution of that
vexed question will not be attempted here; it suffices to say that the
Court was obviously unwilling to make this leap.
215 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny, but finding
that Michigan Law School's narrowly tailored use of race furthered a compelling state interest
in obtaining a diverse student body).
216 Strict scrutiny presumes that any use of race is presumptively void, which is but another
way of saying that governments must not use race as a decisional factor; that is, governments
must be color-blind in their actions. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan,J.
dissenting).
217 The educational value of racial diversity inheres in the presumption that different identity
groups have different cultural and social experiences and that the experiences of historically
disadvantaged minorities are of particular value in helping students of all backgrounds appreci-
ate the multiplicity of viewpoints and experiences that compose America. In addition, the Grut-
ter Court accepted the idea that an ethnically diverse nation must use ethnicity to ensure that
the portals of education are open to every ethnic group, which is simply another way of saying
that it is imperative to respond to the effects of past subordination by taking ethnicity into ac-
count in government decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 129-36.
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Because the Court did not choose the third option, its nature is
speculative; however, the Court's opinion in Grutter leaves some clues
from which we may speculate. The Court might have emphasized
education in a somewhat different manner. Even if the Court was
unwilling to declare education a fundamental constitutional value
(and thus overturn San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez2l8), it might have emphasized the pivotal role of education in in-
forming equal protection values, from Brown v. Board of Education 9 to
Plyler v. Doe.210 In the context of racially based admissions, the argu-
ment would have drawn frankly upon the anti-subordination theory
of equal protection, but would have confined its applicability to edu-
cation because of education's unique power to effect powerful social
and economic transformation. Stitched into that argument would
have been the Court's contention in Grutter that some judicial defer-
ence to university administrators in the performance of their duties is
appropriate in order to maintain a climate of free academic in-
quiry.2' While this argument, as applied to public university admis-
sions decisions, is an extension of priorjudicial deference to universi-
ties in the name of academic freedom, it would have been more
plausible if it were offered as a reason to depart from strict scrutiny
(perhaps to intermediate or some other lesser degree of heightened
scrutiny) rather than as a reason to defer to the accused government
while strictly scrutinizing its actions. The thrust of the imaginary ar-
gument would have been roughly as follows: (1) all governmental
uses of race are presumptively invalid and almost all are subject to
strict scrutiny; (2) very few governmental uses of race, while presump-
tively invalid, should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny or some
other form of heightened scrutiny; (3) the categories to which re-
duced scrutiny applies should be limited to the unusual moments
when i) governments act as gatekeepers to public institutions that
promise to transform the lives of those who enter, ii) there are
218 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to declare education a fundamental right, and applying
minimal scrutiny to uphold Texas's property tax-based public school funding system that fa-
vored more affluent communities).
219 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down race segregation in public schools as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
220 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (using enhanced minimal scrutiny, which asked whether the state
had a "substantial interest," to strike down a Texas law that deprived illegal immigrant children
of a public education).
221 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (recognizing the "complex educa-
tional judgments [administrators must make] in an area that lies primarily within the expertise
of the university").
222 See, e.g., id. at 2356-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court bases its unprecedented def-
erence to the Law School-a deference antithetical to strict scrutiny--on an idea of 'educa-
tional autonomy' grounded in the First Amendment.... [T] here is no basis for a right of pub-
lic universities to do what would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.").
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independent constitutional reasons to defer (in part) to the judg-
ment of the government gatekeepers, and iii) the challenged use of
race strongly appears not to be motivated by racial bias, prejudice, or
stereotype; (4) the use of race as one factor in an individualized as-
sessment of candidates for admission to public universities is, at least
at this moment in our history, a use of race that qualifies for inter-
mediate scrutiny. The rest of the imaginary opinion would proceed
along familiar lines, probing the importance of the objective and the
substantiality of the use of race to the accomplishment of the objec-
tive.
The hypothesized opinion would have preserved tiered scrutiny
far better than did the Court's chosen method. While it must be
conceded that the imaginary opinion would open the door to further
litigation about which other uses of race might be suitable for re-
duced scrutiny, at least the imaginary approach would confine the
debate within a familiar crucible. The Court's approach in Grutter
may prove to result in much the same end as the imaginary opinion,
but the collateral cost to tiered scrutiny is likely to be much higher.
When Lawrence and Grutter are taken together, they display a doc-
trine in disarray. Lawrence makes a shambles of the search for non-
textual liberties by trivializing the difference between fundamental
and nonfundamental liberties. Grutter transforms strict scrutiny from
an implacable skepticism that places upon the government the high-
est burden of justification for its presumptively wrongful acts to a
modified version of minimal scrutiny, in which rhetorical homage is
paid to the form of traditional strict scrutiny but the substance of the
inquiry is almost as deferential as traditional minimal scrutiny. When
223one includes the so-called "enhanced minimal scrutiny" cases, in
which classifications have been struck down for want of a legitimate
purpose or lack of a rational relationship to some legitimate purpose,
the neat categories of tiered scrutiny are seen to be like an ancient
and neglected barn-sagging toward an inevitable collapse.
23 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional
amendment enacted to restrict legal protection for homosexuals as unrelated to legitimate state
interests, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying minimal scrutiny to invalidate on equal protection grounds
the city's zoning ordinance as applied to a home for the mentally retarded, because the exclu-
sion of the group home was not rationally related to the city's legitimate interests); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that even though undocumented aliens are not a suspect
class and education is not a fundamental right, a Texas statute that restricted state funds from
funding the education of children who were not legally admitted to the United States violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it did not further a "substantial goal of the state"); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating the denial of food stamp
benefits to a group of "unrelated persons" as not rationally related to furthering any govern-
ment interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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While it is premature to pronounce tiered scrutiny dead, or even
to be administering last rites, it is not too early to speculate about the
future of tiered scrutiny or its possible replacements. Perhaps the
Court will return to the categorical approach that constitutes the
heart of tiered scrutiny, take the doctrine seriously once again, and
inject new vitality into what now seems to be a decrepit and ailing pa-
tient. Failing that triumph of will, the odds are that tiered scrutiny
will be transformed into one of two variant modes of scrutiny.
The first, and more obvious, mode is a version of the flexible, or
"sliding-scale" scrutiny that Justice Thurgood Marshall long advo-
cated. In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,224- Justice
Marshall dissented from the Court's refusal to recognize a public
elementary and secondary school education as a constitutionally fun-
damental right or to treat classifications on the basis of wealth as con-
stitutionally suspicious. He argued that the Court's equal protection
decisions "defy ... easy categorization" into the pigeonholes of tiered
scrutiny.2 5 Marshall contended:
[The Court] applied a spectrum of standards .... This spectrum clearly
comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will
scrutinize particular classifications, depending.., on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recog-
nized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
22 6
Application of this principle requires recognition that courts do not
"act in a social vacuum.... [C]onstitutional principles of equal-
ity ... evolve over time; what once was a 'natural' and 'self-evident'
ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious con-
straint on human potential and freedom."227
Marshall's alternative to tiered scrutiny might perfectly explain
the reasoning in Lawrence, except for the fact that the Court in Law-
rence did not ground its decision in equality principles. Putting that
minor detail aside, one reading of Lawrence is that it represents an
implicit triumph of Marshall's spectrum-of-values methodology. At
bottom, Lawrence is grounded in the recognition that laws that once
maintained a natural order or which were self-evidently valid have
now come to be regarded as "artificial and invidious constraint[s] on
human potential and freedom. 2'  Grutter fits somewhat less easily
into this explanation, but the fit is not terribly awkward, particularly if
we regard Grutter as covertly acknowledging the power of the anti-
224 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
225 Id. at 98 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 98-99.
227 City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
228 Id.
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subordination conception of the equal protection guarantee. In a
sense, Grutter can be seen as rooted in the notion that, while all racial
classifications are inherently suspect, those uses of race that in good
faith are designed to move the culture beyond race ought not be
automatically condemned, for they have the promise of promoting
the elimination of "artificial and invidious constraint[s] on human
potential and freedom."2
The second, and perhaps less likely, mode of scrutiny that might
develop in the wake of tiered scrutiny is open adoption of judicial
value selection. It is hardly novel to observe that courts have for some
time been engaged in selecting the values that they regard as pro-
tected by the Constitution,230 but the devices by which this value selec-
tion has occurred have been obscured by the trappings of tiered scru-
tiny. In free speech, for example, courts select the categories of
speech that receive little or no constitutional protection by assessing
both the governmental interest in regulating such speech and the
degree of connection between the category of speech and the under-
lying reasons for protecting free speech.23 ' That process results in ju-
dicial value selection, and the values chosen are hardly constant over
time, as brief examination of obscene,2 3 2 defamatory, or commercial
23M Id.
230 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985) (offering a classic collec-
tion of essays arranged around this theme).
231 Compare Melville B. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935, 942 (1968) (describing the process
of "definitional balancing" or "categorical balancing," by which the Court balances competing
policy considerations for "the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as
'speech' within the meaning of the first amendment"), with T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (criticizing definitional or categorical
balancing).
232 The definition of obscene speech has morphed from speech that tends "to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences," Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) 3
L.R.-Q.B. 360 (U.K.), to speech that "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest,"
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957), and which is "utterly without redeeming social
importance," id. at 484, to sexually explicit speech that the "'average person, applying contem-
porary community standards,'" would find patently offensive and which lacks "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Roth,
354 U.S. at 489). The test used in Hicklin, rejected in Roth, was commonly accepted by Ameri-
can courts prior to Roth. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472, 474 (Mass. 1930)
(finding Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy "obscene, indecent and manifestly tending to
corrupt the morals of youth"); Commonwealth v. DeLacey, 171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930) (finding
D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover obscene under the standard that it tended to corrupt
the morals of youth).
233 Until New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which held that defamation
against a public official is protected speech unless such statements are false or are made with
reckless disregard for whether it was false or not, defamation enjoyed no constitutional protec-
tion whatever. Since then, a modestly complex body of constitutional law has developed defin-
ing the scope and nature of the constitutional protection extended to defamatory speech. See,
e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (declining to extend the Sullivan rule to
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speech2 34 (to cite only three such categories) will confirm. Much the
same process has occurred with equal protection, where the Court
has chosen to protect such extratextual values as proportional repre-
sentation and elimination of property qualifications for voting in
such special elections as bond elections.3 Of course, the process of
value selection has stood at its zenith in substantive due process,
where the Court has parsed history, tradition, conscience, and the
demands of ordered liberty to locate unwritten fundamental liber-
ties.2 36 All of these choices, however, have been conducted within the
rubric of strict scrutiny. Only fundamental liberties are supposed to
trigger strict scrutiny of regulations that invade their domain; only
material infringements of fundamental rights (such as voting) or the
use of suspect classifications are supposed to be subject to strict scru-
tiny in equal protection. Yet, as the levels of tiered scrutiny become
ever more elastic-as strict scrutiny becomes deferential and minimal
scrutiny becomes hard-eyed-the defining role ofjudicial value selec-
tion becomes ever clearer. The challenge will be to justify naked
judicial value selection.
A recurring issue in constitutional theory is the legitimacy of judi-
cial review. That issue is considered pass6 in many quarters, partly
because we have such a vibrant and lengthy tradition of judicial re-
view and partly because it is so obvious that we must have judicial re-
view to fulfill the Constitution's promise of preservation of individual
private figures, although holding that liability for defamation in such cases must be predicated
on at least a finding of negligence); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending
to public figures the Sullivan rule that defamation of public officials is constitutionally protected
unless it is uttered with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its falsity).
234 Until Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976), which held that commercial advertising of prescription drug information is protected
speech under the First Amendment, commercial advertising enjoyed no constitutional protec-
tion. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding prohibition of any
handbill or other advertising matter on the streets). After Virginia Pharmacy, the degree of pro-
tection afforded commercial advertising has increased, to the point that, following 44 Liquor-
mart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), in which the Court struck down Rhode Island's
ban on price advertising of alcoholic beverages, it is debatable whether or not the Court is pre-
pared to treat restrictions upon truthful commercial speech with the same degree of height-
ened scrutiny it applies to other content-based restrictions on speech. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CF.
REV. 123 (discussing the division on the Court regarding the proper standard to apply to re-
strictions on commercial speech).
235 See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (striking down a rule limiting
voting on general obligation bonds to property owners); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969) (voiding a restriction of the vote to property owners in elections for issuance of
revenue bonds); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voiding a rule
limiting voting in school district elections to property owners or lessees or those with enrolled
schoolchildren); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating disproportionate represen-
tation and creating the "one person, one vote" rule).
236 See supra notes 13-14.
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liberties. While it is not my purpose to challenge judicial review as il-
legitimate, it is appropriate to ponder the effect on judicial review of
unvarnished judicial value selection. The Court's legitimacy stems
from many sources: our tradition of accepting its decisions, its prac-
tice of delivering written reasons for its decisions, the insulation of
judges from ordinary politics, and a judicial tradition of arguing
about constitutional meaning within a limited range of modalities
(e.g., text, precedent, history, prudence, and structure). Tiered scru-
tiny has fit within this veil of legitimacy because the triggers for
heightened scrutiny have been identified for the most part by refer-
ence to history, text, precedent, and constitutional structure.2V But if
tiered scrutiny should collapse, to be replaced by unconcealed judi-
cial selection of constitutional values that are privileged against gov-
ernmental invasion, public deference to the Court may well erode.
No matter which side of the legal and cultural divide created by the
issue of same-sex marriage you may be on, consider the furor over the
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to compel issu-
ance of same-sex marriage licenses. Perhaps this will die down, and
the court's decision will be accepted, but we have some reason to
doubt that such hotly contested issues are likely to achieve wide-
spread public acquiescence. Just as Roe v. Wade 2 and its successor,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,24° have not quelled a significant minority
of Americans from challenging the legitimacy of abortion as a consti-
tutional liberty, and just as Dred Scott v. Sanford4' hardly put the consti-
tutional and moral issue of slavery to rest, it is likely that naked judi-
cial selection of constitutional values will increase the rate at which
the Court's judgments are openly challenged.
Perhaps for this reason it is unlikely that the Court will openly
embrace naked value selection as a decisional methodology. If not, it
faces yet another choice. It can revive tiered scrutiny, abandon it for
a neo-Marshallian version of flexible, "sliding-scale" scrutiny, or de-
vise some new procedural tools for application of various degrees of
judicial scrutiny to alleged constitutional violations. To revive tiered
237 See generally PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (2d
ed. 1984) (presenting a general theory of judicial review and constitutional decision making,
evoking historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments, among others).
238 See supra note 213.
239 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (using a trimester framework to assess whether governmental inter-
ests at any point during gestation might be sufficiently compelling tojusitfy infringement of the
constitutionally fundamental abortion right).
240 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that, where a state regulation imposes
an undue burden on a woman's choice to abort, such a regulation violates her due process
rights).
241 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a former slave was not "free" by virtue of be-
ing in Missouri because Congress's power to regulate the territories only applied to those terri-
tories that were part of the United States when the Constitution was drafted).
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scrutiny, the Court must respect its own doctrine; strict scrutiny must
really be strict and, if not "fatal in fact, ''112 it must at least never be
deferential; minimal scrutiny must be deferential, but perhaps not so
devoid of scrutiny as to be "virtually none in fact. 2 ' A revival of
tiered scrutiny would require the Court to make its value selections
the old-fashioned way, by characterizing the liberties or classifications
at issue as, respectively, fundamental or suspect (and justifying that
characterization), before applying the requisite level of scrutiny. The
present form of tiered scrutiny pushes the value selection process fur-
ther along in the process, to the point where it mocks the level of
scrutiny the Court has chosen to apply. A choice of neo-Marshallian
spectrum scrutiny more nearly comports with the present actual prac-
tice but would force the Court to articulate the reasons for protecting
any given liberty (or not), or validating (or voiding) any given classi-
fication, on an ad hoc basis. To the extent that such a spectrum-
based approach would produce predictable and consistent results, it
would probably not look much different from traditional tiered scru-
tiny; to the extent that the ad hoc method of spectrum scrutiny would
produce seemingly haphazard results, it would invite the same sort of
criticism that is likely to attend naked value selection. Some new
form of scrutiny, as yet unknown, might cut this Gordian knot, but
what form would it take?
I am unwilling to speculate at any length about unknown and
imaginary forms of scrutiny but a few observations may be in order.
It is possible that the Court could simply reverse the usual presump-
tion that all governmental action is constitutionally valid, and indulge
in a presumption that all governmental action is presumptively void,
placing the burden of justification for any government action on the
government. This libertarian's delight would still necessitate selec-
tion of the evidentiary burden that the government must bear in or-
der to justify its action and, in all likelihood, there would inevitably
be created varying levels of proof that would mimic tiered scrutiny.
In any case, the starting point would be that all government action is
presumptively void, and that seems to be an unduly skeptical starting
position. At the other extreme, the Court might continue to pre-
sume the validity of government action and depart from that pre-
sumption only when an indisputably textual constitutional liberty is
placed at issue. This would represent a marked retreat from the
present posture such that, even if existing precedent were left undis-
turbed, new and evolving claims of liberty would go unheeded. The
paucity of satisfactory new approaches might simply represent a
242 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
243 Id.
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
failure of imagination, but might also suggest that we would do better
to honor that which has served us reasonably well for most of the
twentieth century.
CONCLUSION
The venerable institution of tiered scrutiny is threatened with col-
lapse. As its structure has become ever more complicated, its applica-
tion has become increasingly unwieldy and uncertain. This process
of change (or, perhaps, decay) has been accelerated by the Court's
decisions in Lawrence v. Texas and Grutter v. Bollinger. Although widely
hailed for their results, the decisions, taken together, seriously un-
dermine the structural postulates upon which tiered scrutiny is
founded. Deference to government judgment, once the exclusive
hallmark of minimal scrutiny, now is an aspect of strict scrutiny, while
minimal scrutiny sometimes lacks any deference to governmental
judgment. While the ultimate result is uncertain, tiered scrutiny is at
a crossroads.
Tiered scrutiny may resolve itself into an ad hoc form of review in
which the Court validates or voids each challenged act of government
on the basis of a fluid assessment of the importance of the right as-
serted, the perceived invidiousness of the alleged infringement, the
relative importance of the government interests at stake, and the
linkage between those ends and the challenged actions. Such scru-
tiny is indistinguishable from that which Justice Thurgood Marshall
advocated for many years in applying the Equal Protection Clause.
The present posture of tiered scrutiny may prove to be aberra-
tional; the Court may abandon its present tendencies and revert to
the earlier form of strict scrutiny, in which levels of scrutiny had dis-
tinct meaning and the tiered categories were policed by more hard-
edged doctrine. The Court shows little inclination to adopt this ap-
proach. The present position of tiered scrutiny did not occur over-
night, as by an earthquake knocking a great structure off its founda-
tions. Rather, tiered scrutiny has been undergoing continuing
change, and the direction of that change has been inexorably toward
applying different de facto levels of scrutiny within each nominal tier.
Some new form of judicial review may ultimately replace tiered
scrutiny. While the nature of this new form is entirely speculative, it
may well be that any such development will rely heavily upon overt
judicial selection of values to be given presumptive constitutional
protection. Of course, such judicial value selection has long been a
staple of our constitutional law; the only new wrinkle in this specula-
tive development would be open reliance on judicial value selection
as a method of identifying constitutional norms that are immune
from infringement by ordinary politics. That choice, should it occur,
may be problematic, for it inserts the Court more obviously and
(Vol. 6:5
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clearly into the arena of unvarnished political passion. Perhaps the
Court is already there and open choice of constitutional values is
simply the way the Court will recognize its present posture.
In the end, tiered scrutiny may be like the mythical Phoenix.
Every five hundred years the one and only Phoenix would build a
nest, settle in, and ignite it to become its funeral pyre. Once con-
sumed in the flames, a new Phoenix would rise out of the ashes to
begin the cycle anew. While it is too soon to declare the death of
tiered scrutiny, the Court may well be building its funeral pyre. We
can only await the new Phoenix.
